Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan  Revolution by Scott-Railton, John
U.S. Naval War College 
U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons 
CIWAG Case Studies 
1-2013 
Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 
Libyan Revolution 
John Scott-Railton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies 
Recommended Citation 
Scott-Railton, John, "IWS_03 - Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan 
Revolution" (2013). CIWAG Irregular Warfare Studies. 3. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-
studies/14 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in CIWAG Case Studies by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital 

































irregular warfare studies 
number 3
 center ON 
  irregular warfare
  AND armed groups
Revolutionary Risks:  
Cyber Technology and Threats  
in the 2011 Libyan Revolution
John Scott-Railton
U. S. Naval War College
COVER
Anti-Mubarak protester takes  
picture in Cairo, February 2011.  
Photo by Peter Macdiarmind/Getty Images
Revolutionary Risks:  
Cyber Technology and Threats  
in the 2011 Libyan Revolution
Irregular Warfare Studies
Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups
U.S. Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, Rhode Island 02841
In 2008 the U.S. Naval War College established the Center on Irregular Warfare 
and Armed Groups (CIWAG). The center’s primary mission is to bring together 
operators, practitioners, and scholars to share academic expertise, knowledge, and 
operational experience with violent and nonviolent irregular warfare challenges. We 
are committed to making this important research available to a wider community 
of interest and across Joint Professional Military Educational ( JPME) curricula. Our 
goal is to support the needs of civilian and military practitioners preparing to meet 
the challenges of a modern, complex international security environment. CIWAG 
publishes two separate series of case studies as a part of the center’s expansive, 
ongoing effort of workshops, symposia, lectures, research, and writing.
The Irregular Warfare Studies are a collection of case studies that examine the use 
of irregular warfare strategies by states and nonstate actors to achieve political goals. 
These cases address a wide variety of irregular challenges on the spectrum of political 
violence and competition that encompass current-day or historic armed groups and 
conflicts, as well as the use of other irregular strategies and means to achieve political 
goals, including gray-zone activities, economic coercion, information operations, 
and resource competition.
Revolutionary Risks: 
Cyber Technology and Threats
in the 2011 Libyan Revolution
John Scott-Railton
U.S. Naval War College
Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups
The logo of the U.S. Naval War College authen-
ticates Irregular Warfare Studies, Number 3, 
Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and 
Threats in the 2011 Libyan Revolution, by John 
Scott-Railton, ISBN: 978-1-935352-54-9, as  
the official U.S. Naval War College edition of 
this publication. Use of the U.S. Naval War 
College logo and ISBN 978-1-935352-54-9 is 
strictly prohibited without the express written 
permission of the Editor (or Editor’s designee), 
Naval War College Press.
Reproduction and distribution are subject to the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and applicable treaties of 
the United States. Copies of all or any portion 
of this work must be clearly labeled as such, and 
are required to credit the author, series, full title, 
and the U.S. Naval War College. Contact the  
Naval War College Press regarding commercial 
use and copyrights.
Center on Irregular Warfare 
and Armed Groups (CIWAG)
U.S. Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, Rhode Island 02841
Published 2021
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 978-1-935352-54-9 (paperback)
This publication is cleared for public release 
and available on the CIWAG webpage at: 
https://usnwc.edu/ciwag 
For more information contact: 
ciwag@usnwc.edu. 
Suggested citation: 
Scott-Railton, John. 2021. Revolutionary 
Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in  
the 2011 Libyan Revolution. CIWAG  
case study series 2013, ed. Richard Crowell, 
Marc Genest, and Andrea Dew. Newport, 
RI: U.S. Naval War College, Center on  
Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups.
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-00001
ISBN: 978-1-935352-54-9
Contents
List of Figures (Charts, Graphs & Illustrations) viii
Acknowledgments  ix
Message from the Editors 3
INTRODUCTION Opposition Technology and Its Vulnerability
 to Pro-Regime Attacks 7
CHAPTER ONE Libyan Internet Connectivity Before the Revolution 13
 The Users 13
 The Internet Under the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  14
CHAPTER TWO The Net Goes Dark 17
 The Internet Blackout  17
 Simultaneous LAJ Attempts to Block 
 Other Telecommunications 20
 Effects on Reporting   21
CHAPTER THREE Tech That Turned the Net Back On 25
 Life Without the Internet 25
 Two-Way Satellite Internet: Very Small 
 Aperture Terminals 26
 Vignette: Misurata Reconnects with 
 Two-Way Internet 28
 Libyans Abroad Who Topped Up VSAT Accounts 29
 Other Communications Technologies 
 That Restored Connectivity 29
 A Note on Outside Support for Internet Reconnection 32
CHAPTER FOUR The Public Face of a Networked Opposition 35
 Getting Information Out (and Sometimes Back In) 35
 The “Official” Revolution Facebook Page 37
 Vignette: Advertising for Revolution 38
 Opposition Websites 38
 Vignette: Mohammed Nabbous, Citizen Journalist 40
 Compelling Video 41
 The Libyan Opposition on Twitter 45
 Vignette: Tripoli and the Free
 Generation Movement 49
 Regional Media Centers 51
 A Note on Pro-Regime Online Content 52
CHAPTER FIVE Out of the Public Eye: Decentralized 
 Communications of a Networked Opposition 57
 Networks of Support 57
 Vignette: Internet on the Battlefield 59
 Getting Intelligence and Targeting 
 Information to NATO 60
 Brief Notes on Specific Tools 63
CHAPTER SIX Inherent Risks: Monitoring and Attacks 69
 Pre-Revolution Monitoring at Home and Abroad 69
 Regime Monitoring and Hacking Prior 
 to the Revolution: What We Know 70
 Electronic Operations by the LAJ Against 
 the Libyan Opposition 76
 Malware Samples from PGEA Attacks: An Analysis 83
CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusions 89
 Asymmetries of Risk 89
 Comprehensive Vulnerability 90
 Risks Never Addressed 91
 Moving Forward 93
Appendix A  Libya Country Profile 95
 Libya Before the Uprising: A Brief Note 95
 Libya Today 95
Appendix B  Timeline of the 2011 Libyan Revolution 96
 The Arab Spring 96 
 The Early Days 96 
 The United Nations Security Council Passes
 Key Resolutions, NATO Begins Air Campaign  99
 The Libyan Conflict Extends on Multiple Fronts  99
 Multiple Opposition Fighting Forces Gain Control of 
 Remaining Pockets of Gaddafi Loyalists 100
Appendix C  The Libyan Electronic Army–History and Structure 101
Appendix D  Terms and Abbreviations 103
 Common Terms  103 
 Common Abbreviations 105
Further Reading  107
Study Guide   109
About the Author  113
List of Figures (Charts, Graphs & Illustrations)
Intro 1 Map of Libya 6
1.1  Internet, Facebook, and Al Jazeera penetration rates in 
 Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia 13
2.1  March 3, 2011, attempts to connect to hosts on the 
 Libyan Internet 18
2.2  Google’s Transparency Report 20
4.1   Advertisements for a revolution 38
6.1  ZTE marketing presentation 74
6.2  Potential, simplified command and control hierarchy 
 of the Libyan Electronic Army for one LEA unit 77
Acknowledgments
I’d like to thank Morgan Marquis-Boire (Google, and Senior Technical 
Advisor, Citizen Lab, University of Toronto), for the malware analysis and 
identification featured in the report, as well as helpful comments and dis-
cussions; Matthieu Aikins for insightful conversations and perspective  
arising from his fantastic work for Wired on the Libyan government’s 
surveillance infrastructure, as well as threats to journalist security covered 
in the Columbia Journalism Review; Russ McRee (Microsoft) for initial 
malware analysis and discussion as the project developed; and Professor 
Richard Crowell (Naval War College) for extremely helpful dialogue 
throughout the writing process. I also want to thank Professor Crowell 
along with his colleagues Dr. Marc Genest and Dr. Andrea Dew for the early 
encouragement (and persuasion) to see the value to others in pursuing this 
unconventional project in a field far outside my own; Ron Diebert (Citizen 
Lab, University of Toronto) for feedback and discussion of themes of state-
sponsored attacks; and John Pollock (Contributing Editor, MIT Technology 
Review) for sharing his thoughts and useful concepts as well as invaluable 
and detailed feedback on an earlier draft. My gratitude also goes to the many 
Libyans who offered thoughts, observations, commentary, malware samples, 
and other material to help me understand what they fought for, and bravely 
lived through. Thanks also to many others, too numerous to mention, 
who’ve dialogued with me about the ideas and topics in this study. Finally, 
special thanks to Janet Parkinson (Naval War College) for responsive, 
careful editing, encouragement, and patience.
Humbly dedicated to Muhannad Bensadik (KIA, Ajdabiya, March 12, 2011)  
and Mohamed Nabbous (killed in Benghazi, March 19, 2011).

Revolutionary Risks:  
Cyber Technology and Threats  
in the 2011 Libyan Revolution

Message from the Editors
Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan  
Revolution is the story of how the author and selected colleagues adapted  
existing information communication technology to help the Libyan  
opposition, counter the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya government’s shut down 
of communications to outside the country in 2011. The case study is built 
from experience and contacts, stemming from recorded audio calls, and 
supplemented with after-the-fact conversations and open-source research. 
At the time of writing, John Scott-Railton was a doctoral student at UCLA, 
and a Research Fellow at the Citizen Lab, University of Toronto. This research 
focuses on the free flow of information, particularly in conflict zones, and 
understanding threats to secure communications. Government attempts to 
subvert and control the flow of information during internal crisis also have 
direct application to evolving concepts of disputed informational control and 
denial within contemporary cyber conflict. 
Scott-Railton’s foray into irregular information conflict came via Egypt,  
as Mubarak’s regime shut down the Internet to keep the world from seeing 
events in Tahrir Square and other areas around the country. He and sev-
eral friends outside Egypt called into the country for information, then 
instructing an increasing circle of contacts inside Egypt to call cell phones 
outside Egypt. These calls were then recorded and the content tweeted 
or posted on other social media. Realizing that faster and more accessible 
connectivity  was needed, the author formed @jan25voices, a network of 
associates whose information surrounding the conflict eventually reached 
millions of people, and providing grassroot support that gave a voice to 
Egyptian people on the street. They skillfully used both connectivity and 
content to outmaneuver government forces to ensure a flow of information 
out of the country, and past the Internet shutdown. The audio and video 
content coming from inside Egypt had an emotive effect that brought 
European and global audiences to support the opposition with money, 
connectivity, content, and support. 
This group of tech-savvy innovators have provided a wealth of knowledge 
on how information content and code (software) are used in contemporary 
civil conflicts. Their successful denial of government informational control 
led to freedom of action for the opposition in the 2011 conflict. This 
also led to military support from the U.S. and NATO that ultimately  
allowed the opposition to defeating the Gaddafi regime, and the eventual 
election of a new government.
This is a study in the theory and practice of information warfare within 
a civil conflict. It tells how cyber technology was used in support of the 
ouster of the world’s longest reigning dictator, and is deliberately not 
written with military jargon, but written with the civilian user in mind.
Although it is our hope that Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and 
Threats in the 2011 Libyan Revolution will be a useful historical study, 
it’s important to note that due to the complexity of civil unrest and inter-
action in Egypt, across North Africa, and throughout the Levant, this 
research is focused on the events in Egypt during 2011. The author also 
observed similarities between Libya and the civil war in Syria, correctly 
predicting that the Syrian regime would add malware and hacking to 
their electronic operations. 
CIWAG provides this case study in the Irregular Warfare Studies 
series to assist those interested in conducting research on the use of  
information communication technology, social media, and cyber  
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Figure Intro 1  Map of Libya 
© Copyright: One World - Nations Online, OWNO, nationsonline.org. 
Editor Klaus Kästle. All rights reserved. 
Opposition Technology and Its Vulnerability  
to Pro-Regime Attacks
In the besieged city of Misurata during the 2011 Libyan revolution, Ali 
was using a two-way satellite Internet link to browse Google Earth, scroll-
ing the blue marble, zooming, and precisely marking areas around the city.1 
Considering the constant stream of shelling, this might have seemed like  
an odd time to be working on a program commonly associated with 
recreational mapping and Earth viewing. Yet he was using Google Earth 
for a purpose more in line with the program’s original design: imagery 
intelligence and targeting.2
Misuratis wanted to encourage NATO to intensify airstrikes, especially 
against areas where Gaddafi’s forces had established supply routes, including 
some streets within the urban fabric of the city. Communicating with and 
organizing large volumes of coordinates from fighting groups that weren’t 
Steve Rhoades, Revolution Tools—Facebook Twitter, https://www.flickr.com/photos/ari/8126756699, 
licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
    INTRODUCTION
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always equipped with GPS units was a problem, especially as the data had to 
pass through multiple hands on their way to the Misuratis’ NATO contacts. 
To organize and keep the targeting information accurate, Misuratis turned 
to Google Earth.
Ali and others would receive information from fighting groups on Misurata’s 
different fronts, sometimes as a coordinate, sometimes as a verbal description 
of a location that he and his team knew and could find by browsing. They 
would confirm the location with Google Earth and drag a pin to mark the 
position, label it, and take a screenshot. The team compiled sets of these files 
and sent them by e-mail to a contact associated with Libya’s National Tran-
sitional Council and other groups outside Libya that were in direct contact 
with NATO.
The approach was clever, and simple. Yet, as with so many of the ways that 
the Libyan opposition leveraged the Internet and various free tools, 
electronic actors acting on behalf of the Gaddafi regime identified its use 
and attacked opposition computers by exploiting key human vulnerabilities 
in how the information was transmitted. Using hijacked e-mail and Skype 
accounts, pro-government electronic actors developed and circulated spear 
phishing attempts that encouraged recipients to execute files with names 
like gadaffigooglemaps, natocontacts, and gaddafimaps. These files actually 
contained remote-access Trojans: If a user double-clicked on the file, he or 
she downloaded a piece of malicious software designed to take control of 
the computer and exfiltrate information like keystrokes and screen captures, 
making it possible to capture credential information and ultimately to 
hijack users’ accounts. Ali’s e-mail account, like many others, was eventually 
hijacked, probably through this mechanism.
The 2011 Libyan revolution was marked by the intensive use of cyber 
technology. This case study reviews some of the roles that the technology 
played in the conflict, beginning with the Gaddafi regime’s shutdown of 
the Internet. It highlights how the Libyan opposition reconnected itself 
and how connectivity was leveraged for a wide range of strategic and tactical 
aims. It also describes how the opposition was attacked electronically,  
underlining the vulnerabilities inherent in using common online tools 
during a military conflict. 
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By early February 2011, both Tunisia and Egypt had undergone revolutions, 
surprising much of the world. Many interpreted the speed and scope of these 
transformations to be at least in part a product of the potent ability of  
Internet connectivity to enable and accelerate disruptive social transformation. 
Sandwiched by Tunisia and Egypt, the leadership of the Libyan Arab  
Jamahiriya3 (LAJ) under the longstanding dictatorial regime of Muammar  
Gaddafi appears to have taken a similar view about the dangers of the  
Internet, even as the first discussion of a potential Libyan uprising began. 
From the first days of the uprising, the LAJ undertook a range of measures, 
from a total Internet shutdown to electronic attacks against the Libyan  
opposition’s use of social media and communications. These attacks, 
although sometimes incurring substantial costs for the opposition, were 
not able to effectively deny it access to Internet connectivity or to fully 
degrade its many uses. Libyans quickly restored their own Internet access, 
completely bypassing the regime’s networks and piercing the blackout with 
thousands of individual connections. 
The blackout decisively pushed Libyans toward decentralized ways of 
connecting, such as two-way satellite Internet, almost totally bypassing 
the Libyan government’s expensive and sophisticated network monitoring 
equipment and effectively ending the LAJ’s ability to control Internet 
access. Yet evidence suggests that the Gaddafi regime remained aware of the 
Internet’s importance throughout the conflict. Facing an adversary whose 
connections were no longer passing through their networks (and thus 
observable or vulnerable to disruption), the Gaddafi regime and electronic 
actors acting in support of it embarked on a set of campaigns to blunt the 
Internet’s power and, in some cases, exploit connection vulnerabilities to 
regain their ability to spy on the opposition. 
The Libyan opposition made extensive use of the Internet and various 
online tools for many tasks, including fighting battles, nominating targets 
to NATO, and coordinating logistics. Libyans used social media tools like 
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to broadcast an increasingly sophisticated 
stream of images, news, and information to the online public. The impact 
of these activities was amplified by conventional media’s intense reliance on 
online sources.
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This case study highlights how family networks meshed with social net-
working to create responsive and highly situationally aware clearinghouses 
for information. Central to the role of the Internet in the 2011 Libyan 
revolution was the role that it played in connecting Libyans as individuals 
and groups not just to the Web but also to transnational networks of diaspora 
Libyans and their supporters. These networks engaged in advocacy and 
other communications activities and provided a key backbone to the  
revolution, coordinating everything from aid to weapons.
The story of the role of the Internet in Libya’s 2011 revolution is fascinating; 
much of it still needs to be documented and preserved. This case study 
addresses two issues that form part of this larger story: 
 1.  What strategic roles did Internet communications tools and tech-
nologies play in the 2011 Libyan revolution, and how were they  
used by the opposition?
 2.  How did the LAJ and its supporters try to use these tools, and 
what were their effects? 
Question 1 is answered by laying out and examining these tools and  
activities deployed by the opposition to restore and maintain connectivity 
and to use it strategically for public and private communications activities. 
To answer question 2, the case study lays out information about efforts by 
the Gaddafi regime to disrupt, degrade, exploit, and otherwise compromise 
the Libyan opposition’s use of the Internet, beginning with best-available 
information at the time of writing about the regime’s monitoring and 
surveillance capabilities. The study further highlights how many of the tools 
used by the opposition, including social media, introduced substantial new 
risks, many of which weren’t fully understood or mitigated during the conflict.
The effectiveness of some of these attacks illustrates the ways in which  
opposition practices introduced substantial new operational security  
challenges and vulnerabilities that do not appear to have been well  
understood during the conflict. The case study also highlights the role of 
pro-government electronic actors and the unique threats they posed to the 
Libyan opposition. It concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
these vulnerabilities and the emergence of such actors for other conflicts, 
revolutionary risks  11
especially those in which direct and substantial foreign military assistance 
is not provided.
The subject matter is difficult, and much is still kept secret by the parties 
to the conflict. The organization of and privileging of certain themes and 
techniques over others in this study reflects the author’s judgment about 
how to bridge gaps and provide a consistent picture. Geographically, too, 
the case study is limited by the author’s greater familiarity with some 
locations (e.g., Misurata) than others. Some important details and themes 
have thus undoubtedly been overlooked.
This case study combines two sources of information to answer the guiding 
questions: open-source information, including news reports, articles, blogs, 
postings, and other publicly available material pertaining to the 2011 Libyan 
revolution; and information and materials provided by Libyan opposition 
members and supporters who were active participants in the revolution. The 
rationale for supplementing the research with direct dialogue with Libyan 
opposition members is simple: not only have many “private” elements of the 
conflict been incompletely documented, but now that Gaddafi and his  
regime are gone, Libyans themselves are looking forward, not back. Although 
memories remain strong, some of the details may be fading. This fusion of 
sources and approaches (a term used by the University of Toronto-based 
Citizen Lab) is an attempt to triangulate in on a story that is only partially 
written, much of it still held in the memories and on the hard drives of  
Libyans whose attention has turned toward their country’s continued  
post-conflict reconstruction.
Notes
1. Personal communication with L1, Spring 2012. 
2. Google Earth was originally developed from 
Keyhole Inc.’s EarthViewer 3D, an imagery intel-
ligence platform.
3. Libya’s official name from 1977–1986 was the 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; from 
1986–2011, it was officially called the Great 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In 
September 2011, the name was officially changed 
to Libya. The term “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” 
and “LAJ” are used to refer to the Gaddafi-based 




Libyan Internet Connectivity Before the Revolution
The Users
The Internet was introduced to Libya in 1998, initially as a purely government 
service unavailable to the general public. Two years later, in 2000, Internet 
connectivity was first made available to Libyan citizens5 and, by 2004, the 
number of Libyans with access to the Internet had grown dramatically. 
While the number of Internet users in Libya varies by source, Libya had 
more than 350,000 Internet users by 2009.6 Compared to its neighbors 
Egypt and Tunisia, this number reflects a relatively low penetration rate. 
In 2010, for example, Egypt had an estimated Internet penetration rate of 
21% and Tunisia 34%. Libya, in contrast, had only 5.5 % penetration rates 
for fixed users.7 (See Figure 1.1) 
The number of social media users in Libya at the beginning of the 2011 
revolution was similarly small compared to neighboring Tunisia and Egypt. 
Facebook penetration in Libya was at either 2.8% or 4.6%, depending 
on estimates,8 slightly lower than neighboring Egypt (5.1% / 6.8%), and 
substantially lower than Tunisia (15.8% / 20.5%). Twitter similarly reached 
less than 1% of the Libyan population in April 2011.9 The relatively low 
penetration rate for Internet service is in contrast to both the penetration 
rates of Libyan state-controlled television (95%)10 and Al Jazeera (55%).11 
Figure 1.1  Internet, Facebook, and Al Jazeera penetration rates in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia4
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These numbers highlight a mathematical fact: information posted online  
in Libya could only directly reach a tiny fraction of its population. 
The Internet Under the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
In 2009, seven different Internet service providers (ISPs) offered con-
nectivity to Libyans.12 These providers were “subordinated” to the Libyan 
Telecom and Technology company (LTT), which was chaired by Gaddafi’s 
son Mohamed Gaddafi. LTT maintained Libya’s national Internet gateway 
through which all Internet communications entering or leaving the country 
passed. LTT, founded in 1997, was in turn owned by the state-owned General 
Post and Telecommunications Company (GPTC). GPTC also owned 
Libya’s two mobile networks, Almadar and Libyana. This provided the LAJ 
with access to a centralized mechanism from which to monitor and ultimately 
block the Libyan Internet. 
As the 2011 revolution began, according to the Wall Street Journal, the 
LAJ was actively seeking tools to supplement their monitoring apparatus 
with a more comprehensive filtering system.13 Although the regime appears 
to have deployed a number of highly specific blocks of individual websites 
prior to the revolution, little evidence of a comprehensive filtering system 
was found during a 2009 study by the Open Network Initiative.14 Libyans 
thus could connect to the Internet relatively freely, although they did so 
with little apparent knowledge of how comprehensively the LAJ was inter-
cepting and monitoring their online behavior.
Discussion Questions
1.   How did Libya’s level of Internet penetration compare to its neighbors? 
Does this challenge the idea that the Internet could have facilitated an 
Internet shutdown?
2.   How might Libya’s centralized Internet infrastructure and governance 
have facilitated an Internet shutdown?
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Notes
4. “Libya’s Internet Penetration Rate Steadily 
Increasing,” oAfrica.com, February 23, 2011, 
http://www.oafrica.com/statistics/libyas-
Internet-penetration-rate/; “Al Jazeera Television: 
Viewers Demographics,” Allied Media Corp, 
n.d., http://www.allied-media.com/aljazeera/
al_jazeera_viewers_demographics.html 
5. Project Cyber Dawn, Cyber Security Forum 
Initiative, April 17, 2011. 
6. Libya, CIA World Factbook, CIA, 2012, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ly.html
7. The number is likely lower than the actual  
number of those connected in Libya, since it 
doesn’t track the use of mobile Internet  
devices.
8. “Libya’s Internet Penetration Rate Steadily 
Increasing,” oAfrica.com.
9. “TV, Twitter, Facebook and the Libyan Revolu-




10. “TV, Twitter, Facebook and the Libyan Revolu-
tion.” 
11. “Al Jazeera Television: Viewers Demographics.” 
12. “Libya,” Open Network Initiative, Aug. 6, 2009, 
http://opennet.net/research/profiles/libya 
13. M. Coker and P. Sonne, “Life Under the Gaze of 








The Net Goes Dark
The Internet Blackout
The exact calculus undertaken by the LAJ for shutting down the Libyan 
Internet is not publicly known. However, it is clear that LAJ leadership 
considered the Internet a serious threat and, in the wake of the January 25 
Egyptian Revolution, began almost immediately to take steps that appear 
intended to address this risk. On February 13, 2011, Muammar Gaddafi 
issued a public warning to all Libyans: don’t use Facebook.15 During the 
same time frame, Gaddafi’s regime had reportedly also arrested some activists 
who were known to use the Internet, possibly in response to reports of calls 
for protest on February 17.16
The threats didn’t have the decisive effect that the LAJ may have hoped 
for. The first signs that a large popular uprising might be underway  
came on February 15, 2011, when hundreds of Libyans turned out in 
Benghazi to protest the arrest of Fethi Tarbel, a human rights activist  
and lawyer who had been involved in campaigning for the release of  
political prisoners. Interestingly, although calling for the resignation of key 
government figures, protesters’ signs did not call for Gaddafi’s resignation.17 
Tarbel was released following the protest, but a wave of protests  
had already begun. 
The opposition movement grew throughout Libya, apparently taking its 
cue from neighboring Egypt, and the Gaddafi regime shut down the Libyan 
Internet twice for brief periods during the third week of February. The 
reasoning of key figures in the Libyan government that led to these first two 
cuts has never been made public. It is reasonable to assume that the decision 
was at least partly made in light of the key role that the Internet appeared 
to have played in the Arab Spring, as well as reporting in the early days of 
the uprising by Al Jazeera and others that highlighted Internet postings. At 
the time, many also speculated that the shutdown was intended to limit 
information about the crackdown unfolding against Libyan protesters.18
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The first brief outage took place on February 18 and lasted 6.8 hours; the 
second, a day later, lasted 8.3 hours. Following the end of the second shut-
down, a number of commentators noted that it seemed as if the Internet 
might have “returned,” although it was noted that the return seemed more 
extensive in eastern Libya, not Tripoli, where many sites were still reported 
as inactive.20
While this return held true for the next two weeks, the optimism was  
premature. On March 3, at approximately 7:00 pm local time (EET),  
the LAJ deployed a more permanent shutdown.21 This was observed in  
real time by the global Internet monitoring firm Renesys. As the cut began, 
attempts to access websites hosted within Libya began to fail. Renesys 
concurrently reported receiving reports from within Libya that Internet 
services, including browsing, were no longer working. It quickly became 
clear that a full Internet blackout had begun.22  
Figure 2.1  March 3, 2011, attempts to connect to hosts on the Libyan Internet (using a 
diagnostic tool) show a rapid decrease in the 12:00 and 18:00 UTC 19
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Renesys noted that rather than disconnecting itself from the Internet, as 
the Egyptian government had done, the LAJ had instructed its network 
firewall to block almost all traffic, except for a small trickle. This probably 
indicated that the regime sought to maintain Internet connectivity for 
certain activities. Renesys concluded:
The Internet is a valuable wartime resource, like a critical bridge over 
which supplies can flow. As long as you can deny it to your enemy, you 
don’t blow it up — you keep it intact for your own use.23
The LAJ’s approach was to place Libya’s Internet on what Renesys called  
a “warm standby.” This not only preserved the Internet for its own use  
but also softened the initial visibility of its block. Renesys continued:
[The Egyptian web blackout had] signaled to the world that the Egyptian 
government considered itself out of options, ready to cut off internal com-
munications and external dialogue, looking for a last chance to turn off all 
the cameras and clean out [Tahir] Square.24
It took most of the day before awareness of the blackout reached most 
international media. Citing the Renesys report, Joshua Keating of Foreign 
Policy blogged that the greater sophistication of the Libyan block compared 
to that used by Egypt may have reflected greater sophistication on the part 
of Libyan authorities. He suggested that Libya might have learned a lesson 
from the Egyptian experience and chosen a less immediately visible form 
of block.25 From the point of view of Libyans, however, the LAJ “warm 
standby” had the same outcome as the Egyptian shutdown: the Internet 
was no longer accessible.26
Some speculated that the Gaddafi regime was also using jamming to block  
a satellite Internet service offered by LTT but managed outside Libya.27
The nature of the remaining Internet traffic (seen as blips on Google’s 
Transparency Report in Figure 2.2) would become clearer much later in the 
conflict, as evidence emerged of groups like the Libyan Electronic Army 
and others acting on behalf of the regime from within Libyan networks. 
Some of these electronic attacks had IP addresses originating in Libya.28 
For the duration of this case study, these individuals and groups acting 
on behalf of the regime will be referred to collectively as pro-government 
electronic actors.
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Simultaneous LAJ Attempts to Block Other  
Telecommunications
As the LAJ was working to cut Internet connectivity, it was also engaged 
in efforts to block other flows of information into and out of the country. 
Arabic-language television programming that reported on the uprising 
and that didn’t hold to the LAJ line was a key target. Al Jazeera reported 
on February 17 that its program had been removed from the LAJ-owned 
cable networks.30 Over the weekend of February 19, transmissions from 
two television satellites that served a wide range of news programming to  
Libya and the region were disrupted by jamming, according to the Lebanese 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.31 And on February 21, Al 
Jazeera accused Libya of jamming its satellite transmissions in the region, 
and stated that it had conclusively identified the jamming as emanating 
from an LAJ intelligence services building south of Tripoli.32
Satellite telecommunications were not immune to LAJ disruption and denial 
efforts, which were likely targeted against the use of satellite telephones like 
the Thuraya handset, which were widely used in Libya. On February 25, 
Thuraya accused Libya of having engaged in a week’s worth of jamming of 
the Thuraya-2 satellite that provided satellite phone and data connectivity 
to Thuraya devices within Libya.33 Shortly thereafter, Thuraya announced 
that its technical efforts had restored voice services to much of Libya.34 
Nevertheless, users of Thuraya phones continued to experience substantial 
difficulty connecting throughout the revolution. 
Figure 2.2  Google’s Transparency Report reveals the almost complete block of Internet traffic 
to Google products beginning on March 3 “E” and “F” 29
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On March 3, the same day as the Internet shutdown took effect, Nic 
Robertson from CNN tweeted from Tripoli: “Security racheted up around 
#Tripoli, at same time, telephone internet access down.”35 Wireless and 
fixed-line telephone service interruptions didn’t last in Tripoli, where some 
telephone services remained available throughout most of the conflict. 
The interruption of cell phone service was to become more permanent in 
eastern Libya, however, and wasn’t reversed until over a month later, when 
Libyan opposition supporters with telecommunications engineering exper-
tise separated Benghazi’s wireless and fixed telephone networks from the 
Libyan national telephone network and made it autonomous. 
Effects on Reporting 
Attempts to limit the flow of information out of Libya extended to foreign 
journalists. Few foreign journalists were inside Libya when the conflict 
began, and the LAJ attempted to maintain this situation by refusing to 
issue visas to foreign journalists once the uprising began. A BBC World 
News editor, writing on February 20, 2011, highlighted the effect that  
this had on his organization’s ability to effectively present the situation:
The BBC and other news organizations are relying on those on the ground 
to tell us what’s happening. Their phone accounts—often accompanied 
by the sound or gunfire and mortars—are vivid. However, inevitably, it 
means we cannot independently verify the accounts coming out of Libya. 
That’s why we don’t present such accounts as “fact”— they are “claims”  
or “allegations.”36
The challenge that news organizations faced in establishing the authenticity 
of “citizen journalism” from Libya remained a theme of reporting through-
out the conflict, and was probably satisfying to the LAJ. Nevertheless, as the  
conflict continued, news organizations developed deeper, more trusting  
relationships with on-the-ground sources, and many elements of the  
opposition developed media centers and more professional approaches  
to documenting conflicts, creating compelling products that made their 
way into news reporting. 
It is worth nothing that the attempt to limit journalists’ access to Libya 
ultimately evolved, and the LAJ began to allow journalists to enter LAJ-
controlled areas, including Tripoli, provided that they stayed in the Rixos 
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Hotel in downtown Tripoli and left the hotel only with government minders 
on choreographed outings. While this successfully limited these journalists’ 
view of the events in LAJ-controlled areas, it also drew unflattering attention 
to the regime’s increasingly desperate attempts to control the discourse. 
Other journalists entered opposition-controlled areas in eastern Libya 
through Egypt, and the Libyan opposition, especially in its early days, was 
extremely open in providing them with access to the fighting. This reporting 
generated a steady stream of information that outweighed in volume of images, 
stories, and access to battles, the coverage from their colleges in Tripoli.
Discussion Questions
1.   What kind of signal did Libya send the world when it shut down the 
Internet? 
2.   What kind of considerations are likely to have influenced the LAJ’s 
decision to shut down the Internet?
3.   How did blocking the Internet affect the credibility of news reports from 
the ground?
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Tech That Turned the Net Back On
In the early days of the 2011 uprising, Libya’s national telecommunications 
systems was heavily utilized by protesters, citizen journalists, and fighters 
alike. For example, on the front lines of the fighting in opposition- 
controlled parts of eastern Libya like Benghazi, most tactical and strategic 
communication made use of Libya’s national cellular network and, in some 
cases, satellite telephones. Similarly, many of the most evocative videos of 
LAJ forces’ and irregulars’ actions against Libyan civilians in Benghazi were 
uploaded using the Libyan Internet. Cellphones as well as Voice Over  
Internet Protocol (VOIP) software like Skype also provided a means 
for news organizations and journalists to connect with Libyan sources for 
information “from the ground.” All of this changed once the LAJ disabled 
Internet, landline, and mobile services beginning in early March. 
Libyans responded quickly to the challenge, deploying a wide range of 
decentralized and ingenious solutions to re-establish connectivity, effectively 
undoing the denial of connectivity intended by the LAJ forces. As the 
Cyber Security Forum Initiative (CSFI) has pointed out, efforts to restore 
connectivity to Libyans both internally and by non-state actors were  
substantially faster than assistance via government channels.37 
Interestingly, the communications shutdowns also rendered the Gaddafi 
regime’s substantial monitoring apparatus for telephony and Internet 
communications deaf, instantly changing the information balance of the 
conflict. Libyan citizens who wished to maintain connectivity were driven 
to alternate, more decentralized forms of connectivity that didn’t pass 
through regime-controlled networks. As will be discussed below, this may 
have triggered a substantial shift in LAJ efforts to intercept communica-
tions—which included deploying commercial cyber espionage tools.
Life Without the Internet
The loss of Internet and cellphone access had an immediate and dramatic 
effect on the communications ability of the Libyan opposition as well as 
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others throughout Libya. Libyans responded almost immediately with ad 
hoc efforts to maintain some form of communications. Initial solutions 
were highly labor-intensive and largely unable to replicate the connectivity 
or bandwidth that the opposition had enjoyed prior to the shutdown. The 
cellular phone shutdown, combined with jamming of Thuraya signals, for 
example, led opposition forces to temporarily resort to a very low-tech  
approach to communications:
“We went to fight with flags: Yellow meant retreat, green meant advance,” 
said Gen. Ahmed al-Ghatrani, a rebel commander in Benghazi. “Gadhafi 
forced us back to the stone age.” 38 
On February 20, 2011, the BBC World News editor highlighted the effect 
of the Internet blackout on the material that they were able to draw from 
Internet and user-submitted sources: 
the flow of video—the so-called “user-generated-content”—has dwindled 
to a trickle as the authorities have periodically turned off the Internet. 
That means we have an additional responsibility—to be clear with our 
audiences not just what little we do know, but perhaps more significantly, 
what we don’t.39 
The trickle sometimes reflected a lot of labor-intensive processes, as video 
clips and news of the uprising had to be physically smuggled out of Libya 
and to the international media. One individual in Benghazi described 
transferring mobile phone video of the uprising to pocket flash drives  
and then transporting them into Egypt, where they could be uploaded.40 
Two-Way Satellite Internet: Very Small Aperture Terminals 
Without access to international and domestic Internet and telephone 
connectivity, many turned to two-way satellite Internet. Information is not 
available about the number of users of two-way satellite Internet in Libya 
prior to the 2011 revolution; however, the technology was frequently  
deployed in remote oil production installations and by others living far 
from urban areas. A typical two-way satellite Internet system, often referred 
to in Libya by its technical name of Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), 
consists of three main parts: a dish, a modem, and a transmitter. VSAT 
systems transmit on a number of bands and receive data services from a 
number of international providers.
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The system has a number of drawbacks that limit its wider use: data transfer 
is slower than typical Internet installations; it is often more expensive; 
and transmissions can be interfered with by bad weather or jamming. 
What became clear, however, is that the 2011 Revolution caught dealers 
of two-way satellite Internet in opposition-controlled towns like Benghazi 
and Misurata with stocks of satellite dishes and equipment, as well as the 
necessary relationships with service providers to register and maintain user 
accounts. In the first weeks of the conflict, the number of VSAT systems 
proliferated, either assembled from components already present in Libya as 
merchandise, “liberated” from government installations, or smuggled into 
opposition-controlled territory from abroad.
Less commonly used in most of Libya were broadband global area network 
(BGAN) devices. These are highly compact two-way satellite antennas 
with built-in data modems, mainly employed by journalists. BGAN  
devices also found their way to the opposition in specific areas, notably 
the Nafusa Mountains.41 
Libyan dissident Niz Mhani of the Free Generation Movement is seen within Tripoli in early July 2011, 
standing next to the VSAT system his group covertly used to keep up a steady flow of information 
critical of the Gaddafi regime. CNN pixelated his face to preserve his anonymity.
Vignette: Misurata Reconnects with Two-Way Internet42 
When the siege of Misurata began, Libyan opposition supporters in the city 
sought ways to show their plight to the world. As one Misurati active in sup-
porting opposition military forces described it, they wanted to “cry for help 
. . . there was no great plan to ask . . . for a solution . . . [it was simply]  
a natural reaction” from a “human being who is being threatened.” 43 When 
the Internet was cut, the mobile video they had captured of shelling and 
skirmishes with LAJ who had advanced on the city couldn’t be broadcast, 
nor could they call Al Jazeera or the BBC to report on casualties. Encircled 
on three sides by LAJ forces, the Misuratis were isolated. 
There was, however, a solution in the stocks of a two-way satellite distributor 
based in the city. As several Misuratis have described it, the distributor realized 
the value of what he had to the conflict and began to provide installations of 
two-way satellite connectivity to key strategic locations within the city. This 
individual also arranged for uninterrupted services to be provided to the VSAT 
systems he had installed, coordinating with his supplier in a Gulf country. 
As one Misurati who hosted several installations recalled, the dealer would 
say, “Once we are done, we will talk about the money.” With the arrival of the 
first chartered ships bringing aid and other materials to Misurata from Malta, 
Tunisia, and Benghazi, the number of VSAT systems in the city swelled. 
VSAT systems were soon installed in operations rooms throughout Misurata 
and used to provide communications support to military operations, the local 
councils, humanitarian and medical aid coordination groups, and media 
centers. As the fighting continued, fronts expanded, and key areas like the 
airport were retaken, they too were equipped with operations rooms and 
VSAT connectivity. Connections were actively monitored by shifts of people 
tasked 24/7 to answer incoming calls and maintain lines of communication. 
VSAT systems remained in use in Misurata after the fight for the city ended 
and the battlefield moved outward, toward the east and west. They continued 
to provide communications between forward operating positions and 
operations rooms, as well as connections to journalists. Beginning in summer  
2011, businessmen in Misurata established their own “operations room” 
with a VSAT connection that allowed them to contact their business partners 
to order materials and goods from outside, brought through the increasingly 
frequent boats from Malta, Tunisia, and Benghazi. By the end of the con-
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flict, several Misuratis agree, there were at least 100 VSAT systems active in 
the city.44 It is also worth noting that, as journalists began to enter the city, 
Misuratis offered them access to their VSAT connections at hotels  
and media centers.
Libyans Abroad Who Topped Up VSAT Accounts 
Two-way satellite Internet, much like normal Internet services, requires 
a subscription with a service provider. Higher bandwidth connections, 
however, are often substantially more expensive than traditional Internet 
services, and charges frequently reflect data usage, creating a need for con-
stant infusions of credit into highly active accounts. Libyans overseas would 
often contribute to the cause by purchasing credits for opposition figures 
whom they knew, sometimes unprompted.45 A recent article documents the 
process, describing how a non-Libyan supporter of the opposition gained 
the trust of opposition figures in order to let her pay for their connections.46 
Other Communications Technologies That  
Restored Connectivity
Although VSAT systems provided a wide range of communications func-
tionality, Libyan opposition members worked to re-establish connectivity 
by making extensive use of tools like satellite phones and two-way radios. 
They also reconnected and reconfigured telecommunications infrastructure 
for landlines and mobile phones. While outside the scope of this case study, 
it should also be noted that “free” radio stations and newspapers emerged 
in opposition-controlled areas, providing pro-opposition news, information, 
and calls to arms. It is likely that captured radio stations served a dual 
morale and propaganda function, as their signals are likely to have been 
audible outside areas controlled by the opposition.47 
Restoring the Cellphone and Landline Infrastructure
When LAJ forces disconnected mobile and landline telephony in Benghazi, 
these services were entirely unavailable for more than a month, forcing the 
Libyan opposition to adopt a wider range of innovative communications 
solutions. The convenience and ubiquity of existing landline and mobile 
infrastructure, combined with the LAJ jamming Thuraya signals, led opposi-
tion supporters to restore a localized telephone network that could operate 
using infrastructure and switches entirely located in opposition-controlled 
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territories.48 After a month of effort, a Libyan-American telecommunications 
executive, with the support of the U.A.E. and Qatar, led a team of engineers 
that modified the Libyan network to provide domestic cellular services to 
Benghazi and other opposition-held areas. Equipment was provided by Gulf 
countries and others, not directly by the original manufacturer, Huawei 
Technologies, which refused to sell the compatible hardware to the  
opposition.49 The engineers also made use of a captured database of existing 
numbers to help restore services. As the Wall Street Journal pointed out:
Without Huawei, the backing from the Persian Gulf nations became essen-
tial—otherwise it is unlikely that international telecom vendors would have 
sold the sophisticated machinery to an unrecognized rebel government or 
individual businessmen, according to people familiar with the situation.50 
The newly operational telephone system was attached to international 
telecommunications networks via satellite. Initially, although these phones 
were able to connect within the network, only a few connections to the 
global telephone network were made, reserved for the use of key opposition 
figures. In the early days of access to the restored system, all local calling 
was unbilled. As connectivity expanded, access to cellphones dramatically 
improved communications for a growing circle of opposition members, 
not just between the city and the front lines. It also improved their ability 
to connect to supporters and family abroad to negotiate for international 
support and weapons supplies, and to discuss strategy with envoys. 
Although eastern Libya received much more media attention at the time,  
it wasn’t the only area where connectivity was restored. In June 2011, some  
of the same people who worked to restore connectivity in Benghazi traveled 
covertly to the besieged city of Misurata to undertake a similar project, 
with training and material assistance from Dubai and other Gulf states 
as well as an international group of opposition supporters. Some groups 
traveled to the city to assist in restoring electricity and other utilities, and 
telecommunications engineers began restoring base stations and rebuilding 
the Misurati network.51 According to a Misurati telecommunications expert 
familiar with the installation, the internal network was readied by July and 
became operational in early August. By the end of August, however, the 
temporary network was disassembled, and the communications infrastructure 
plugged back into Libya’s larger network.52 Because the connection was 
implemented much later in the year than Benghazi’s network, Misuratis, 
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like opposition forces in western Libya, were left without telephone or  
cellular service for the majority of the conflict.
Radios
The use of tactical radios by the Libyan opposition grew after the conflict 
began; however, most of their communication took place on insecure, 
unencrypted, and unscrambled handheld radios. One Libyan who was 
involved with establishing a communications system during the battle of 
Bani Waleed in September and October 2011 described the network through 
which battlefield reports and command and control communications took 
place. Unencrypted radios were used on the battlefield to communicate 
from the front lines to forward operations rooms; VSATs were then used  
to communicate back to central operations rooms.53 
Although a small number of encrypted radios were eventually introduced into 
the opposition forces, most radios were apparently used for communications 
in the clear. The risk associated with the use of unencrypted radio during 
the conflict was evident, and Misuratis invented a series of word codes and 
pseudonyms to conceal their true meaning from LAJ forces. “We knew that 
the Gaddafi regime was listening to the radios,” said one Libyan familiar with 
the city’s tactical communications infrastructure. Sometimes, he explained, 
the ability of both sides to hear each other led to a somewhat less tactical 
use: trading insults with opposing forces over open channels.54 Similar 
stories are told by an opposition operative familiar with the situation in 
the Nafusa Mountains.55 
Satellite Phones
Libyans made extensive use of satellite phones despite their limitations, 
which included difficulties with connectivity, cost, rapidly draining batteries, 
and the need for callers to stand in exposed locations to make calls. As an 
opposition supporter pointed out, satellite phones also needed topping 
up with credit like VSAT services. VSATs simplified the process, making 
it possible to use the Internet to make top-up purchases of credit, but in 
many cases relatives and others abroad purchased credit for in-country 
opposition supporters.56 
The persistent attempts by the Gaddafi regime to thoroughly jam Thuraya 
phone services were not effective in denying full access to it or to other  
satellite phone networks, including Irridium and Inmarsat. In response to  
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the use of satellite telephones, the regime issued a threat of execution against 
“un-authorized” Thuraya users in early August 2011.57 As the conflict grew, 
an increasing number of users migrated from Thuraya to other networks, 
both because of the interruptions associated with the intermittent jamming 
as well as a strong perception among many in the Libyan opposition that 
the Thuraya servers were especially vulnerable to LAJ signals intelligence or 
some other form of unspecified interception. The perception seemed to be 
partially due to the existence of commercial agreements between Thuraya and 
Libyan companies.58 It would become clear after the conflict ended that this 
concern was at least in part well-founded: the LAJ was found to have training 
materials for the L3 Communications Tactical Thuraya Monitoring System, 
an interception and localization package developed for field-deployed signals 
intelligence applications. 
A Note on Outside Support for Internet Reconnection
As Libyans scrambled to secure tools that would help them communicate 
without the Internet or cellphone networks, a number of online hacktivist 
groups including Telecomix and Anonymous, following a model deployed 
in Egypt, began posting instructions to Libyans about various strategies to 
circumvent the Internet shutdown, including dial-up numbers for modems 
and other strategies.59 It remains unclear how extensively these materials 
and tools were used. Ultimately, it was Libyans themselves who deployed 
the technologies that restored their connections to the Internet. 
Discussion Questions
1.   What immediate effects did the Internet shutdown have on the Libyan 
opposition’s communications ability?
2.   What kind of trust was required to maintain satellite phone and VSAT 
connectivity? 
3.   In what ways did access to two-way satellite Internet (VSATs) transform 
Misurata’s strategic position? How might their situation have been different 
without access to the Internet?
4.   In what ways was the Libyan opposition able to create a communications 
structure that could serve both military and civilian needs? Can you 
think of key areas that the opposition did not address?
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The Public Face of a Networked Opposition
Getting Information Out (and Sometimes Back In)
As some commentators pointed out while the Libyan revolution was still 
underway,60 the low penetration rates of Internet usage make it hard to 
argue that sources like Facebook or Twitter could have had a direct causal 
role in providing the population with information or views that would lead 
to a revolution. Certainly, information posted on a Facebook group in the 
first days of the revolution is unlikely to have reached even a small fraction 
of the Libyan population via web browsing.
Indeed, it seems likely that, like much of the rest of the Arab world, Al 
Jazeera was a much more widely watched source of information about the 
revolutions in neighboring countries. What, then, was the role of informa-
tion put online during the first days of the Revolution? Free Internet services, 
including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, played a key role in getting 
information out of Libya, even after the Libyan government shut down the 
Internet. Propelling highly charged images, messages, and information into 
social media brought them to the attention of the international media and 
many other stakeholders. Once they reached widely watched channels like 
Al Jazeera, Al Arabaya, BBC, and CNN, many of these images were beamed 
back into Libya. Libyans who had posted them online were, albeit indirectly, 
broadcasting to the world, as well as back into Libya.
In a media environment where there was a strong, sometimes explicit, 
intuition that other countries would follow, evidence was eagerly sought for 
indicators that uprisings were beginning elsewhere. Access to social media 
allowed Libyans both inside the country and in the diaspora to post and 
read messages calling for protest. In the second week of February, 2011, 
these messages reached Libyans indirectly, as international media organi-
zations like Al Jazeera reported on calls to protest and speculated about 
whether an uprising might be expected for Libya. 
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As videos and tweets and social media postings began circulating online, 
painting a picture of the extent of the protests and the violence of the LAJ 
response, they were picked up by international news organizations. This 
challenged the messaging of the Gaddafi regime, which went to great lengths 
to portray Libyans as firm supporters of Gaddafi and unsuccessfully tried to 
downplay the significance of these statements. It also created the appearance 
of widespread support for the revolution. One reporter observed:
there has been another critical factor at work that has ensured that social 
media has maintained a high profile in these revolutions. That is the 
strong reliance that mainstream media such as the Doha-based television 
network Al Jazeera has had to place on material smuggled out via Facebook, 
YouTube and Twitter. This arrangement means that videos have often been 
broadcast back in to the country of origin – when Al Jazeera has managed 
to avoid having its signal blocked.61 
Sultan Al Qassemi, an influential commentator on the Arab Spring who 
maintains a widely followed Twitter feed,62 explained how he saw the role 
of social media in the Arab Spring: 
Where social media had a major impact was conveying the news to the 
outside world, bloggers and Twitter users were able to transmit news bites 
that would otherwise never make it to mainstream news media. . . . This 
information has been instrumental in garnering the attention of the citizens 
of the world who expressed solidarity with those suppressed individuals 
and may even put pressure on their own governments to react.63 
As the revolution continued to grow and as Internet connectivity was 
restored, two-way Internet connections made possible a rapidly available 
stream of reports, video, and voices documenting LAJ forces’ actions from 
inside the country. International media was able to call directly into fierce 
battles and otherwise inaccessible areas and receive a live update on the 
events. Libyan expatriates and exiles meanwhile maintained websites and 
Twitter feeds that aggregated and sometimes broke news about the conflict 
or solicited material support for aid and donations.
Before international correspondents were able to enter the besieged city of 
Misurata, for example, a number of increasingly organized groups began 
documenting the fighting using techniques that have come to be associated 
with citizen journalism. Sometimes these groups referred to themselves as 
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“media committees,” “media centers,” or “information committees.” They 
took video cameras with them to the front lines, documented the fighting, 
and uploaded the material on Misurata-specific pages and channels on 
social media sites like YouTube and Facebook. All of this content flowed 
through two-way satellite Internet, maintained on VSAT terminals. These 
efforts were complemented by Misuratis’ near-constant communications 
with international media via Skype voice and video calls, again over two-
way satellites. Articulate and compelling voices, especially doctors, were 
reliably available to speak to media at all hours and to present evidence of 
the city’s plight in the form of casualty numbers and descriptions of the 
wounded. As the fighting went on, this grew to include information about 
material captured from LAJ forces and updates on battles. Many Misuratis 
agree that the arrival of international correspondents was a turning point 
for increasing the international attention paid to Misurata. Still, as one 
remarked, “If it wasn’t for the Internet and Skype, the world would have 
never heard of anything that went on in Misurata.” 64 
The “Official” Revolution Facebook Page
In Libya, where public expression of dissent was rare prior to the revolution, 
some of the earliest public calls to protest could be found on Facebook. The 
“Day of Rage” Facebook page,65 for example, which called for protests on 
February 17, 2011, received attention from Al Jazeera and other news media 
organizations shortly after it was created. Reports on the calls to protest 
were often accompanied by descriptions of the numbers of individuals who 
had “liked” or “joined” these calls. Al Jazeera actively reported on the page 
prior to February 17, noting that the site had had 4,400 followers on Feb-
ruary 16 and that it had doubled to 9,600 followers the following day.66 
Facebook was used extensively during the revolution, with both real-life 
and electronic groups and individuals creating a dramatic volume of pages 
in support of the uprising. The trend continued as the military element 
of the conflict wound down. In December 2011, the scale of this growth 
became clearer. Metrics of Facebook penetration rates indicate that Libya 
briefly became Facebook’s fastest growing country in terms of national 
users, with a 588.86% increase in users from June to December 2011, to 
316,000 users.67 
Vignette: Advertising for Revolution
One young Libyan Internet user living in North America decided prior to 
the beginning of mass protests on February 17 to encourage other Libyan 
Internet users to access Libyan opposition websites.69 His strategy? In what 
might be the first case of online advertising for a revolution, the 24-year-old 
purchased advertising space on Facebook targeting its 316,440 users who 
were registered as living in Libya. He designed his own small advertisements 
that encouraged Libyans to visit opposition websites and provided them 
with advice about how to circumvent regime IP filtering by changing their 
domain name servers (DNS).70 When the opposition website he’d been 
directing viewers to was subjected to attack, he produced new advertising 
encouraging Libyans to visit the Day of Rage Facebook page. His reason-
ing was that the Facebook site could much better withstand any attempt 
at a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. His advertisements were 
displayed over 7 million times and resulted in over 60,000 clicks, 50,000 of 
them to the “official” site of the revolution, and they ran until the Libyan 
government decisively implemented the Internet blackout.
Opposition Websites
Prior to the revolution, many Libyans relied on opposition websites for 
news and opinion that challenged the Gaddafi regime’s control of informa-
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Figure 4.1  Advertisements for a revolution. The advertisements provide advice about how to 
change DNS servers to make blocked sites available and encourage users to click to visit Libyan 
opposition websites. Metrics shown to the author indicate that the first advertisement was 
shown 33,365 times to Facebook users registered in Libya, the second to 41,037 users.68 
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tion. Websites like Libya News and Views,71 maintained by an expatriate, 
aggregated reporting about the country, and its politics didn’t track the 
LAJ’s official line. If some websites focused on gathering and providing 
news that were stifled, others, like Enough Gaddafi,72 more directly lobbied 
for the departure of the Gaddafi regime. As calls for protest grew, these and 
other opposition websites began posting calls to protest, and in some cases 
hosting messages from Libyans urging others to join in the protest.73 
A number of websites were established to serve as clearinghouses for infor-
mation about the uprising. These sites aggregated and monitored Libyan 
social media feeds as well as international news or directly reported news 
and information from sources within the country. The largest of such sites, 
http://feb17.info, became a clearinghouse for information on the events in 
Libya. Media outlets used the site as an information source and a reliable 
ticker for events in Libya. It received millions of comments and even more 
traffic.74 Another website, www.libyafeb17.com, played a similar role, albeit 
at a somewhat smaller scale. These sites’ impact was impressive, especially 
given the sometimes small number of people staffing them. As the operator 
of feb17.info posted about the experience:
As a matter of fact, we were only a team of 2 people! That’s right, only two 
of us. Myself and my wife Sanne. My name is Haret Alfasi and I am a 24 year 
old Libyan raised in the UK. Tinkering with websites since the age of 12 led 
me down the path of web development which is what I do for a living. . . .  
At its peak, Libyafeb17.com was two laptops and a 19” Samsung monitor.75 
Others brought a range of technical skill sets to documenting and reporting 
on the uprising. A website hosting a map of Libya that documented acts of 
violence against protesters and the shifting territories under the opposition 
and LAJ control was viewed over 314,000 times in the first 12 days of 
the revolution.76 
Ad hoc groups and individual users were not alone in aggregating and 
“curating” social media information about the Libyan Revolution. Major 
news organizations including the New York Times, the Guardian, the BBC, 
Al Jazeera, and Reuters all maintained live-blog-style websites that compiled 
material in a streaming or continually updated format, often in a fusion of 
their own reporting, tweets, updates from the wire services, and so on.
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Vignette: Mohammed Nabbous, Citizen Journalist
In the early days of the revolution, an articulate young Libyan man, 
Mohammed Nabbous, burst into prominence as a citizen journalist carry-
ing updates from Libya to the world. Nabbous, who had operated a small 
Internet service provider in Benghazi, took advantage of his expertise and 
access to resources to set up a live broadcast of events taking place using the 
freely available functionality of the Livestream.com website. Livestream 
allows users to set up live-streamed video and audio feeds, while requiring 
only minimal technical expertise. Nabbous created a feed which he titled 
“Libya Alhurra,”77 or “Free Libya.” He began by installing a series of cameras 
at the Benghazi courthouse, which he streamed beginning on February 19, 
sometimes all at once and sometimes in tiled windows. The feeds made it 
possible to watch raw, real-time feeds of protesters as they marched in the 
main square, and they illustrated the scope of civilian support for the uprising 
and the varied demographics of the protesters.
On February 19, Nabbous began with a plea: Speaking into the camera, he 
requested international support for and attention to the violent response 
of LAJ forces to the Benghazi uprising. In one of his first videos, broadcast 
live, he can be seen talking via Skype with a journalist as he broadcasts the 
feed, sometimes repeating himself to answer her questions over the low-
bandwidth connection. In the first video, reposted on YouTube, his message 
is clear, and compelling:
Screenshot of Mohammed Nabbous 
speaking during his first broadcast.
How can you people just watch 
us being killed? . . . if we actually 
die there is . . . another group of 
my people . . . they’re going to be 
online with you tomorrow so you 
can see how many funerals . . . how 
many people get buried. . . . I can’t 
assure that I’m going to be alive 
in five minutes . . . I’m not afraid 
to die, I’m afraid to lose the battle 
. . . that’s why I want the media to 
see what’s going on.78 
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Nabbous quickly became a key point of contact for international media 
seeking to cover the uprising. He used his Skype connection to do live 
interviews with major international news organizations including CNN,  
Al Jazeera, and the BBC.79
Nabbous’s Livestream channel was watched by over 452,000 unique viewers 
in the first six weeks of the uprising, a volume that has been calculated at a 
total of 25 million “viewer minutes.” 80 His feed didn’t just attract viewers: a 
group of supporters and facilitators both in Libya and outside the country 
joined to help promote the feed and engage in various support activities.  
Assisted by a group of international supporters, he increasingly took on 
a role similar to a correspondent: taking his car and his camera to the 
front lines, investigating the aftermath of attacks, and even “broadcasting” 
information back to his Livestream via cellphone calls. Nabbous was shot 
dead on March 19 while reporting on apparent evidence that LAJ forces 
were not respecting the UN-demanded ceasefire of March 17, 2011 (UN 
Security Council Resolution 1973).
Compelling Video 
The video-sharing website YouTube played a key role in disseminating video 
content from Libya. The first days of the conflict were marked by a series of 
videos, including some of the earliest evidence of protests in Benghazi from 
February 15 and disturbing footage of the LAJ forces’ attempts to quash 
the rebellion. These videos were often shaky and amateurish, captured 
with cellular phones. In retrospect, it seems clear that the early video clips, 
sometimes accompanied by the filmers’ commentary, helped an interna-
tional audience see apparent eyewitness accounts of the Gaddafi regime’s 
responses to Libyan protests. 
In the early days of the conflict, for example, a YouTube channel maintained 
by the exiled opposition group the National Front for the Salvation of Libya 
hosted some of the earliest clips of protest in Libya, including a protest that 
took place on February 15.81 These videos and similar ones were often mul-
tiply posted by individual accounts, and as the conflict went on, also posted 
to specific pro-opposition channels.
In the early days of the conflict, for example, a YouTube channel maintained 
by the exiled opposition group the National Front for the Salvation of 
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Libya hosted some of the earliest clips of protest in Libya, including a protest 
that took place on February 15.81 These videos and similar ones were often 
multiply posted by individual accounts, and as the conflict went on, also 
posted to specific pro-opposition channels.
Videos posted on YouTube could quickly reach both domestic and inter-
national audiences. While many received substantial traffic on YouTube 
itself, the site also served as a mechanism to provide media content to news 
organizations that often rebroadcast them, sometimes with caveats about 
their inability to confirm the images’ veracity. On February 22, for example, 
YouTube user “muttardi” posted a video titled “Yellow Hat Mercenaries – 
Bazaar St. Benghazi,” showing men wearing yellow hard hats and raiding a 
Benghazi street.82 Interestingly, YouTube’s statistics indicate that the video 
received substantial viewership in Libya, suggesting a domestic audience in 
the early days of the revolution. 
Yet the video wasn’t limited to internal consumption. Like many others, 
it was quickly shared on multiple social media sites, including Facebook, 
where other users had reposted it. An embedded video on Facebook appears 
to have quickly driven over 9,000 viewers to the video almost as soon as it 
“First footage from the brave Benghazi demonstrations,” YouTube video posted 
February 15, 2011 by the National Front for the Salvation of Libya
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was posted. Soon thereafter, the video was picked up by Al Jazeera’s Live 
Blog,83 which drove another 14,600 views. This, along with the rush of views 
to the original posting, appears to have propelled the video to YouTube’s 
home page, which quickly generated more than 30,800 views. In less than 24 
hours, the video was circulated globally, picked up in online postings by the 
Spanish El Pais,84 the Belgian Het Nieuwsblad,85 the French Liberation,86 
the German Der Spiegel,87 and many other news organizations. 
Recognizing the power of user-generated content, news organizations 
sometimes sought to directly solicit material. Al Jazeera, for example, had 
introduced a platform called Sharek that allowed its viewers to submit 
video and other content to the news network. According to Al Jazeera’s 
head of social media, up to 1,600 videos a day were submitted to the site 
during the Arab Spring.88 Videos from Libya were among the many from 
the Sharek platform that apparently made it onto the network’s broadcast-
ing. The content sometimes included highly troubling images of the civilian 
toll of war, or possible human rights violations. In the early days of the 
siege of Misurata, for example, a widely viewed video uploaded through 
“Yellow Hat Mercenaries – Bazaar St. Benghazi.” Note the hand holding what appears 
to be a cellphone or camera, also recording the scene.89 
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the platform showed a young girl in a cast in a hospital bed, identified as an 
8-year old, who describes being shot in the leg near her home.91 Like many 
similar videos, it was subsequently mentioned and embedded in a number 
of outlets, including the New York Times’ blog.92 
As the conflict escalated, an increasingly sophisticated group of Libyans 
and Libyan opposition supporters supplemented the amateur and user-
generated content by working to create more streamlined and informative 
content documenting the many features of the conflict, from humanitar-
ian and logistical topics to video of battles, martyrs, captured material, 
prisoners, and evidence of potential human rights violations. Other videos 
showed behavior on the part of the LAJ forces that appeared to violate 
international norms of warfare. In many opposition-controlled areas, these 
documentary groups took over responsibility of covering the front lines,  
attempting to avoid compromising the operational security of the opposition, 
and adopting various practices for increased personal safety and security.
“Libya: 8-year-old girl shot in leg.” The caption reads: “As Tweets were coming indicating 
that there was some violence in Misurata today, we get a video vie the Sharek platform, 
showing an 8-year-old girl named Fatima who says she was shot near 
her home – she’s in a hospital in Misurata.” 90 
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Some video was too graphic to make it onto Western news, although it 
spread widely online. Other compelling video made it into the news,93 
either provided directly or through journalists’ vetting of material posted 
online, known as user-generated content. YouTube’s role continued to be 
a key part of how international observers and consumers of media were 
exposed to the conflict: even Gaddafi’s final moments were captured and 
posted to YouTube by dozens of Libyans, perhaps more. 
The Libyan Opposition on Twitter
From the early days of the revolution, Twitter provided a constant stream 
of updates and information. Some accounts provided dispatches from the 
situation on the ground, with varying degrees of precision and objectivity. 
Others aggregated reporting and news on the Libyan conflict in mainstream 
media sources or aggregated information from other users. Yet the use of 
Twitter didn’t end with journalistic transmission of information. Other 
Twitter accounts provided running commentary and dialogue about the 
conflict, as well as how it was covered. Key public personalities in the uprising 
like activist Guma al Gumaty94 maintained feeds, as did many other actors in 
the conflict, some using pseudonyms like @changeinlibya.95 They weighed 
in on issues or highlighted developments, and encouraged their followers 
to attend protests abroad. The influential commentator and Twitter user 
Sultan Al Qassemi named some of the other uses of social media during the 
early days of the uprising: 
Other uses for social media were to transmit information on medical 
requirements, essential telephone numbers, and the satellite frequencies of 
Al Jazeera—which is continuously being disrupted.96 
In other cases, Twitter users used open-source information and personal con-
tacts to gather information about LAJ figures abroad, posting personal phone 
numbers and other details of LAJ ambassadors and encouraging their fol-
lowers to call them.97 Notably, Twitter was also used in an attempt to directly 
influence the outcome of the conflict by providing information to NATO.98 
In the earliest days, this included feeds that had existed prior to the uprising, 
including the Twitter feed of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya99 
and a Twitter feed associated with Enough Gaddafi,100 both of which also 
maintained websites. As the conflict began, a second wave of Twitter  
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accounts emerged, some manned by individuals tweeting from inside 
Libya, others by members of the Libyan diaspora or other supporters who 
used phones and Skype to call into Libya to get updates. 
The number of tweets grew rapidly, creating a volume and pace of material 
so great that it could not be monitored as a single feed without some form 
of filtering. As had been the case in Egypt, Twitter users engaged with 
Libya converged on a set of hashtags like “#feb17,” “#Libya,” and “#Tripoli” 
that they often appended to their messages to identify tweets as relevant to 
the revolution and make them easy to find. 
The mainstream media paid a great deal of attention to Twitter as a source 
of information during the conflict. This usage wasn’t limited to breaking 
news or pointing their followers to stories. Journalists and media organiza-
tions reported on events as “being reported on Twitter” as they developed, 
often before the same events were able to be reliably confirmed and reported 
through the major wire services. In other cases, specific journalists engaged 
directly with Twitter, using it to curate and refine citizen journalists’ and 
Twitter users’ coverage of the events, even enlisting their followers to 
engage in tasks like identifying ordnance used in the fighting. Journalists 
and other Twitter users sometimes used replies to tweets (public) or direct 
messages (private) to contact potential sources for interviews or to request 
clarification of a particular piece of news. This attention was tempered by 
the difficulties that news organizations faced in quickly confirming much 
of the tweeted information. In some cases, this reflected news organizations’ 
limited on-the-ground access to correspondents and verifiable sources 
throughout all of Libya. Rumor and exaggeration were amplified, making it 
difficult for a casual observer to sort through the high volume of tweets.
The account of the Libyan Youth Movement (LYM) was one of the most 
widely followed Twitter feeds of the 2011 Libyan Revolution and provides 
a window into the many ways in which Twitter was used to cover the upris-
ing. The group’s Twitter feed, @ShababLibya, was initially run entirely by a 
small group of young Libyans based in the diaspora who operated the feed 
in contact with relatives and friends on the ground. It gained prominence 
early in the uprising for its near real-time information and commentary 
in support of the opposition, and quickly became a nexus for information 
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from inside the country as well as news updates. These grew to include details 
about NATO strikes, aid needs, reports of atrocities, and recorded telephone 
calls into Libya. At points the group also had members inside Tripoli who 
complemented the tweeting from the outside. The group, which also operates 
from a Facebook site, describes itself thusly: 
We are a group of Libyan Youth both in & out of Libya inspired by our 
brothers & sisters in Egypt & Tunisia. We’ll do our best to bring Libya 
back Inshallah.101 
The Twitter feed remains active today, with more than 65,000 followers 
and more than 22,000 tweets. It is largely managed and operated by Ayat 
Mneia, a young Libyan-Canadian. The LYM fielded an impressive range of 
media requests, and its members sometimes appeared directly on Al Jazeera. 
In other cases they worked to connect journalists with sources, a widely 
practiced but under-acknowledged element of the reporting on the Libyan 
revolution. The tweets from within Libya, often telegraphing information 
that hadn’t yet been verified by news organizations or found on news wires 
like AP and Reuters, frequently provoked responses from journalists seeking 
further information. At times, the tweets themselves were reported as news. 
As the conflict continued, the LYM and others became more sophisticated in 
presenting information, adopting an increasingly journalistic style, including 
conventions like “Breaking:” to describe developing news, and more carefully 
highlighting the reliability of information. Along with many other Twitter 
feeds, it attempted to increase the accuracy of NATO strikes by tweeting 
targeting information. 
Although groups like the LYM were primarily supported by Libyans, some 
supporters came from outside the Libyan community, such as Janice Clinch 
from Ontario, Canada:
The 59-year-old has never met anybody from Libya. She has not visited the 
Arab world; chronic pain makes it hard for her to get around. But from 
her home near Seeley’s Bay, 40 kilometres northeast of Kingston [Ontario, 
Canada], she joined a committed cadre of social media users who have 
become, in effect, volunteer intelligence analysts. On Twitter, Facebook 
and other services, they discuss satellite images, vessel tracking data and the 
latest gossip from their sources inside the country.102 
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Ms. Clinch’s engagement extended beyond simply relaying news and infor-
mation from Libyan social media sources:
Months of online activism earned her a role as administrator of the Libyan 
Youth Movement page on Facebook—the only non-Libyan honoured 
with the job, she says—and on Monday she noticed that a regular member, 
somebody located in western Libya, had pinpointed a gas station converted 
into a temporary headquarters for Col. Gadhafi’s forces. She tweeted the 
co-ordinates, along with the longitude and latitude of a few other targets 
passed along from the same source, asking NATO to “clean up” the 
government troops.
Ms. Clinch was not sure whether NATO had bombed those locations,  
but she continued to scour the Internet for more leads.103 
It is difficult to provide an easy set of categories that describe how many 
pro-opposition accounts covered the conflict. Clearly Ms. Clinch and LYM 
weren’t just amplifying, curating, aggregating, or transmitting information 
from citizen journalists. Although the feeds clearly sought to influence 
people’s perceptions of the conflict and enlist international support, they 
also were viewed by many as a mechanism to more directly support the 
military campaign in Libya. 
Many Twitter reporters didn’t just seek to provide targeting information 
to NATO; they also enthusiastically reported on NATO’s actions, tracking 
airstrikes, explosions, and other evidence of NATO activity even as they 
encouraged NATO to attack certain coordinates. After an airstrike, for  
example, information obtained via communications with in-country 
contacts would emerge on Twitter within minutes, highlighting potential 
NATO successes or posting messages about how the targeting could be  
improved. This kind of information, NATO has acknowledged, was  
included in their post-strike damage assessments.104 
The theme of reporting on NATO activity extended to radio transmissions 
that took place in the clear. For example, recordings of NATO airborne 
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) broadcasts directed towards the LAJ 
forces and the warble of jamming on the same frequency made their way 
online. Information about the number of explosions, material destroyed, 
or amplification of PSYOPS messaging is likely to have improved NATO 
forces’ situational awareness. In these cases, it is also unlikely to have posed 
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a threat to NATO’s operational effectiveness, since it could be assumed that 
LAJ forces would have access to the same information.
Twitter reporting on NATO activities may have introduced new operational 
risks by, for example, reporting on the movement of NATO forces’ aircraft in 
near-real time. In one case, an amateur radio enthusiast who monitored air 
traffic control frequencies picked up transmissions associated with NATO 
combat operations. When military airplanes would “go tactical” as they 
entered Libyan airspace, social media users would re-tweet scanner reports 
noting the transmission and wait to report on the expected strikes. It is 
unclear what, if any, operational value this might have had to the LAJ. 
Vignette: Tripoli and the Free Generation Movement
On June 7, CNN correspondent David McKenzie described the extensive 
efforts undertaken by the LAJ government to script what Tripoli-based for-
eign correspondents saw of the city during their choreographed visits from 
the Rixos Hotel, where they had been sequestered:
The view that journalists get while driving through Tripoli is typically 
witnessed through the windows of government buses driving along routes 
selected by government minders that show a pro-government landscape. 
It’s a view the Libyan government wants the rest of the world to see: 
people united in support for Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi.105 
The image, of course, was an illusion. Tripoli had experienced intense protests 
in the early days of the uprising. After several days of protests followed by 
a heavy-handed crackdown and the heavy presence of security forces, the 
city appeared to have “calmed.” The lack of reportable protests and incidents 
of violence was used by the regime in an attempt to script a story that, 
although the east might be against Gaddafi, Tripoli and much of western 
Libya firmly supported him.
Overt acts of protest in Tripoli were few after the early protests. However, 
one group of activists, the Free Generation Movement (FGM), worked 
steadily to ensure that the world media had access to videos and other mate-
rial showing that Tripoli was not as calm as it seemed. These images were 
not simply for international consumption: featured in major news outlets, 
they were beamed back into Libya and viewed with interest in Tripoli.
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FGM was led by 29-year-old maxillofacial surgeon Nizar Mhani under the 
nom de guerre “Niz,” and relied on a network of in-country and expatriate 
opposition supporters, nearly all in their twenties. The movement’s commu-
nications infrastructure was surprisingly simple. Niz had “liberated” a set of 
VSAT equipment from a government building earlier in the uprising and 
used it to post videos and take Skype calls from journalists, always happy to 
explain in perfect British English just how extensive support for the Libyan 
opposition in Tripoli really was. Later, as the conflict raged in the city, Niz 
was instrumental in making images and reports available that highlighted 
the tenuous control of LAJ forces over the city. 
One video posted by the FGM shows a Molotov cocktail being prepared 
and then thrown against a large pro-Gaddafi billboard in Tripoli. The video 
shows Gaddafi’s face engulfed in flames—and no rush of security services  
to extinguish the fire. Other videos show leaflet drops of anti-Gaddafi slogans, 
and anti-Gaddafi banners unfurled over roadways. Niz and his group also 
posted videos of battery-powered amplifiers connected to MP3 players that 
played a loop of Libya’s pre-Gaddafi national anthem, which were placed 
in concealed or overt locations within the city. Again, tellingly, the videos 
indicated a lack of immediate response by security forces. 
For such activities that broke the illusion of regime control and support, 
Niz and the other members of the FGM were targeted for arrest. The LAJ 
security forces discovered his identity and imprisoned several members of 
CNN report on the Free Generation Movement showing some of its members preparing 
leaflets for dropping in the city (left) and burning a pro-Gaddafi billboard (right).
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his family and friends; Niz and his cousin were forced into hiding. After 
some effort, FGM was again online, broadcasting from this safe house. Niz 
was also subjected to a sustained campaign of electronic attacks, described 
below. Ultimately, he tweeted the entire uprising, with interruptions, and 
was online and posting material when opposition forces entered the capital.
Regional Media Centers 
As the uprising spread, what had initially been uncoordinated efforts to 
transmit information about the uprising to the outside world quickly grew. 
The initial videos and materials had been distributed by individuals or via 
groups like the National Front for the Salvation of Libya that had previously 
maintained an online presence. Over time, a number of groups emerged, 
often tied to specific places like Misurata, the Nafusa Mountains, or Tripoli. 
Sometimes named “media committees,” these groups became key sources 
and clearinghouses for information and content, as well as points of contact 
for international media seeking interviews and updates. 
For example, in the Nafusa Mountains, the town of Nalut established the 
Nalut Media Committee, which maintained a YouTube account as well as 
Facebook pages in Arabic, English, and French.106 At the time of writing, 
their YouTube account had over 1.3 million views. Several towns over, the 
Zintan Media Committee also maintained an Arabic-language Facebook 
page107 and a YouTube account. The media committees’ content was some-
times widely viewed, while in other cases received only limited traffic. 
Misurata similarly developed a series of media groups including Wefaq Libya 
or Freedom Group, which maintained both a YouTube site established on 
February 26, 2011 and a Twitter feed, as well as Facebook pages in Arabic 
and English.108 By May 2012, videos from Freedom Group had been viewed 
over 4 million times. Similarly, the media group Misrata Patriots, formed in 
late April 2011, maintained a YouTube site, a Twitter feed, and a Facebook 
account (which was later hacked by pro-government electronic actors).109 
The video postings of these media groups provides a window into the 
multiple roles that online video played in the conflict. Videos document 
skirmishes and pitched battles with LAJ forces, the effects of shelling and 
warfare during the siege to humans and property, motivational clips set to 
music, and a wide range of glimpses into the lives of Misuratis during the 
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conflict. They not only humanized the Misurati opposition fighters but also 
brought key elements of their plight, and their narrative of a struggle for 
freedom against a brutal dictator, to the attention of the world.
A Note on Pro-Regime Online Content
YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter also became spaces used by pro-LAJ 
individuals and groups to comment on opposition videos as well as to post 
their own content in an attempt to counter opposition messaging. On 
YouTube, for example, this meant filling the comments of pro-opposition 
videos with pro-Gaddafi comments, or mass-disliking pro-opposition 
content in an attempt to reduce its credibility or visibility. In other cases, 
this meant posting videos critical of the Libyan opposition or NATO 
intervention, and then mass-liking the video to increase its visibility. An 
unscientific survey of this pro-LAJ video content in summer 2011 revealed 
that it was often based on video originally produced by Libyan State Televi-
sion, the Iranian Press TV, and Russia Today, all of which had adopted, to 
varying degrees, editorial policies that opposed the revolution, NATO  
intervention, and so on. On Facebook, LAJ supporters created a large volume 
of profiles with pseudonyms and profile photos containing pro-Gaddafi 
iconography and the use of the same green found in the LAJ flag. They 
used these profiles to post pro-Gaddafi slogans and material on their own 
pages and on the pages of those whom they had identified as opposition 
supporters. In some cases, these postings also contained disinformation 
(including false coordinates and other false reports), threats, and accusations, 
such as accusing pro-opposition accounts of being the tools of a foreign 
intelligence service. Some Libyan opposition supporters responded in kind, 
trading accusations and slogans with self-identified regime supporters. Many 
appeared to have avoided taking the bait, however, while others chose to 
report violent language and pro-regime propaganda as violations of the 
terms of service of social media websites, which sometimes resulted in 
content being pulled and profiles suspended.
The often aggressive, taunting, and threatening tone of pro-LAJ activities 
on social media may have undermined the LAJ’s narrative that it was being 
attacked by gangs and thugs. By focusing on attempts to intimidate, silence, 
and berate pro-opposition social media users and content, pro-LAJ online 
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actors often echoed the language used by Gaddafi in his speeches, such as 
calling opposition supporters “rats.” While their postings sometimes claimed 
human rights violations by NATO and the Libyan opposition, these claims 
were often discordant with the volume of aggressive and violent rhetoric they 
used. The overall impression may have instead supported the opposition’s 
public narrative: that the Libyan opposition was faced with an irrational 
adversary, capable of inflicting grave human rights violations against his 
own people. 
Discussion Questions
1.   How did media coverage of social media expand and amplify the reach 
of actions in that realm?
2.   In what ways does Mohammed Nabbous exemplify the ways in which 
individual Libyans were able to use the Internet to influence the interna-
tional perception of the Uprising?
3.   How did the Libyan opposition’s use of YouTube evolve over the course 
of the conflict? What effect is this likely to have had on their credibility?
4.   What does Ms. Clinch’s story indicate about how the Internet can make 
global networks of support possible?
5.   How did the pro-regime online activities and messaging on social media 
contrast with that of pro-opposition online activity?
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Out of the Public Eye: Decentralized Communications 
of a Networked Opposition
Largely outside of the public eye, and intentionally concealed, the Libyan 
opposition made comprehensive use of a range of online tools to support 
their communications activities. Many of these networks were ad hoc. Yet 
the Internet played a substantial role in supporting the opposition’s com-
munications networks. Key coordination activities, from communications 
between frontline operations rooms and command centers to strategy 
discussions between opposition leadership and their international envoys 
to aid logistics, took place over restored Internet connections, as did private 
communications with journalists, aid and advocacy organizations, and 
representatives of foreign governments. The Internet even supported battlefield 
communications: collaborative targeting information was collected and 
sent to NATO contacts using free and accessible online tools like Google 
Earth, Skype, and Hotmail; and information was relayed between operations 
centers in the opposition command structure. Without attempting to be  
exhaustive, this section provides a brief introduction to some of these  
activities and tools during the 2011 Libyan revolution and concludes with  
a brief discussion of some of the associated vulnerabilities.
Networks of Support 
Libya is not a large country, its population is relatively concentrated in 
urban areas, and, as commentators have noted, everyone seems to know each 
other. The Libyan diaspora is similarly linked to relatives and others back 
home, often by familial and geographic ties: a Misurati living in the Europe, 
for example, is likely to have strong and direct connections to other family 
members and cousins still in Misurata, as well as to other Misuratis in the 
diaspora. These kinds of network deserve brief discussion here, although 
they ultimately merit sociological study in their own right. 
In a comprehensive article in the MIT Technology Review, John Pollock has 
described these family networks and personal connections as a “cousinate.” 110 
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Established long before the 2011 uprising, these networks allowed Libyans 
caught inside the country to quickly connect to networks of trust, relatives 
and friends outside. Not only did these networks make it possible to know 
who someone was, but they also made it possible to verify people as trust-
worthy, enabling networks from different places and families to expand, 
and ultimately, link together, coordinating material and political support 
for the uprising. A cousin might be a telecommunications engineer, work in 
an import/export firm, or have standing or prominence in a nation whose 
foreign policy supported the uprising. These people could be synergistically 
linked to other networks with bits and pieces of resources, ultimately 
resulting in a rich array of resources and logistical pathways to put them  
at the service of the Libyan opposition.
An opposition member might have access to multiple distinct categories 
of resources, making their network potentially useful for a wider range of 
activities than would normally fit in a traditional governmental or military 
organizational structure. They could draw on a resource base that was not 
fixed by the constraints of distance or professional hierarchy. Libyan opposi-
tion supporters on the ground and overseas frequently engaged in multiple 
types of activity, operating more as a distributed and networked group 
of resources than the rigidly hierarchic structures of the Gaddafi regime. 
These networks supplied much of the “on the ground” information fed into 
the social media sites, and they also served as trust networks for directing 
resources. While these networks are not the primary subject of this case 
study, it is important to highlight how powerfully they were enabled by  
access to restored connectivity and how their nature structured the kinds  
of communications that took place.
The same individual who might be regularly giving short interviews to  
international news organizations or who maintained a pro-opposition 
Twitter feed might also be directly involved in, say, coordinating material 
support to opposition forces, transmitting targeting intelligence to others, 
or lobbying the Libyan diaspora for funding. One such actor, Rida Benfayed, 
an expatriate who traveled to Libya’s eastern port of Tobruk to support the 
opposition, is a good example of this plurality of roles. Benfayed seems to 
have functioned as a kind of information clearinghouse, receiving a steady 
flow of information and relaying it to the appropriate parties. Benfayed’s 
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Skype account was organized by a series of categories: “English media, Arabic 
media, medical, ground information, politicians, and intelligence.” 111 In 
another case, a Libyan who provided regular interviews to the media from 
Misurata also engaged in identifying targets for NATO, dialogue with a 
foreign country interested in providing material support, telecommunications 
support, and so on.
Not all of the nodes in these networks were Libyans, and it is interesting 
that many of the non-Libyan supporters of the opposition who engaged 
with the conflict electronically also adopted multiple roles. For example, 
Stephanie Lamy was an American living in Paris who was sympathetic to 
the opposition and supported Mohammed Nabbous’s Livestream. Out of 
the public eye, Lamy also worked with contacts to transmit information to 
individuals whom she believed were in contact with NATO. When Lamy 
received information from an individual claiming to have intelligence 
about the movements of LAJ forces and to be retired from an European 
intelligence agency, for example, she transmitted this information to Rida 
Benfayed, who describes subsequently passing it on to Mustafa Abdu-Jalil, 
chair of the National Transitional Council.112 
Many individual opposition actors adopted a node-like strategy, arguably 
allowing individuals to increase their usefulness by contributing where they 
could, across a wide range of domains. In order to do this effectively, of 
course, there needed to be a rich and fluid mechanism for exchanging infor-
mation and knowing what resources were needed. While communications 
tools like Skype could support the person-to-person and group conversations 
that could be used once a specific task or set of resources was identified,  
private and secret groups on Facebook and other sites were used to exchange 
information across networks. They made it possible for individuals who had 
resources or connections to see where they might be able to assist, as well as 
to see who else was committing to support the same task.
Vignette: Internet on the Battlefield
It is mid-April 2011 and a Skype call is about to influence the outcome of a 
battle. Sifaw Twawa in Yefren commands a brigade of anti-Gaddafi fighters. 
They are considering an attack on a Grad launcher113 that is part of the Gad-
dafi force’s siege of the town in the Nafusa Mountains. He gets a call on his 
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cellphone patching him in to a group Skype chat. Two Libyan civilians in 
the diaspora are on the line, one a doctor in the UK, another a researcher 
in Finland. The doctor, Khalid Hatashe, had been trained in the use of 
Grad rocket systems during compulsory military service. He laid out to 
Twawa key information about the Grad system, including the critical fact 
that Tawawa’s brigade was closer to the Grads than their minimum effective 
range, and that the troops operating the Grad launcher might be several 
hundred yards away, operating the system by wire. Their ensuing attack is  
a success, taking the pressure off Yefren.114 
Getting Intelligence and Targeting Information to NATO
NATO forces openly used social media tools like Twitter for occasional 
media messaging. NATO also acknowledged that it engaged in monitoring 
social media for information about the Libyan conflict during Operation 
UNIFIED PROTECTOR. The overall sense among Twitter users during 
the revolution was that NATO and member countries were monitoring 
Twitter to gather information on potential targets, leading many users to 
explicitly tweet at NATO in an attempt to draw its attention to specific 
developments and coordinates. The media picked up on this and by early 
summer 2011 were extensively reporting on NATO’s use of social media in 
its intelligence gathering, as in the following:
NATO officials have acknowledged that social media reports contribute 
to their targeting process—but only after checking them against other, 
more reliable, sources of information.115 
NATO Wing Commander Mike Bracken’s acknowledgment that social 
media was being used to help nominate targets provided the public with 
a window into its official activities and how NATO incorporated social 
media into its analysis:
We get information from open sources on the Internet; we get Twitter. . . . 
You name any source of media and our fusion center will deliver all of that 
into usable intelligence.116 
Another NATO official explained that social media, including Twitter, 
helped focus NATO’s attention to areas where LAJ forces were active:
the organization monitors Twitter feeds from Tripoli and other places for 
“snippets of information.” These could then be tested, corroborated or not, 
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by NATO’s own sources, including direct lines of communication with the 
rebels, and imagery and eavesdropping from Nimrod spy planes.117
The official explained that intelligence gathering using Twitter and other 
social media feeds was only one part of a broader fusion-based intelligence 
methodology, and apparently sought to reassure the public that NATO was 
not relying on information from Twitter as a single source and that it was 
aware that the LAJ might be using Twitter for disinformation: 
[NATO] is also aware that Gaddafi might be using Twitter to feed false 
information. “We have to be careful it is not used for propaganda [by LAJ 
forces],” the NATO official said.118
Tweeting and re-tweeting targeting information in a rapidly developing 
conflict could itself be subject to unintentional distortion and error:
But even in the fast-moving environment of Twitter, intelligence ana-
lysts and armchair generals alike must beware that information can get 
old quickly. Replying to followers who “retweeted” tactical information, 
user Libyanandproud said: “NEGATIVE NEGATIVE, Coordinates 
changed!! FLUID!”119 
Other uses by NATO member forces appear to have ranged from officially 
sanctioned to apocryphal. For example, despite explicit messaging that 
NATO intelligence was monitoring and analyzing social media, NATO 
member countries’ actions in social media were sometimes contradictorily 
reported in the press. One newspaper, for example, reported that a  
Twitter account 
with apparent links to the British military . . . has even taken the unusual 
step of asking users to submit the precise co-ordinates of troops loyal to 
Colonel Moammar Gadhafi.120 
Attempting to verify the claim the next day, a reporter writing for a differ-
ent paper contacted the operator of the account, @HMS_Nonsuch,121 and 
wrote the following:
@HMS_Nonsuch told the Guardian he is a 50-year-old Birmingham man 
called Chris, and has “no connection” to any military or defence organisation.122 
Meanwhile, further out of the public eye, NATO appears to have received 
a wide range of more or less formal targeting information and situational 
awareness from Libyans using social media, Skype, and other tools. A 
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French naval officer describes having created a large network of social 
media contacts in order to collect atmospheric information about the 
Libyan battle space. He soon found himself receiving what he described 
as much higher quality information, including specific information about 
targeting. While provided with no military intelligence, he describes being 
asked detailed questions by his superiors about his information. The officer 
estimated that he was faster than his vessel’s traditional intelligence sources 
80% of the time. He stated that he believed his network of Libyan sources 
provided him with better information than that received by traditional 
French intelligence channels.123 
Many opposition members actively worked to provide information to NATO 
about LAJ forces’ activities. Nagi Idris, for example, describes collecting 
humanitarian and medical information about fighters in Misurata, Benghazi, 
and the Nafusa Mountains. Idris and his wife, Gihan Badi, provided informa-
tion, including precise coordinates when possible, to NATO’s Civil-Military 
Co-operation group.124 Another Libyan worked to establish operations 
rooms in Tunisia, Dubai, and Spain. He described his group as smuggling 
over 100 satellite phones into Libya and gathering detailed intelligence that 
was passed back to NATO. As an apparent mark of the role of networks of 
trust, he was able to get an approximate number of LAJ forces located in 
Brega based on information from a link in his “cousinate” to the company 
that supplied their meals—and he knew this information was reliable,  
because officers received better meals than their men did and the source 
knew how many of each type of meal was being prepared.125
Many other Libyans worked to provide similar information. As one 
Misurati explained, NATO received daily updates from his group and 
others containing targeting information.126 The targeting process was 
straightforward and team-based. Team members would travel to the front 
lines or communicate with the fighting groups to ask if there was “anything 
they wanted hit.” Subsequently, information would be physically brought 
back or transmitted to an operations room where other team members 
used Google Earth and Google Maps to locate the coordinates and create a 
targeting list, including Google Earth screen captures, latitude and longi-
tude coordinates, and short briefs about each target. The targeting packages 
would then be transmitted to several locations, including Doha, where the 
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Libyan opposition maintained direct points of contact with NATO forces, 
and a NATO situation room. NATO would sometimes push questions 
back into this network, requesting clarification or further information. 
While the process allowed groups to transmit a substantial amount of 
timely and, in their view, accurate targeting information to NATO, several 
Misuratis have commented that it was not until foreign personnel in direct 
communication with NATO were physically on the ground in Misurata to 
assist in targeting that NATO responsiveness with air attacks operated at a 
speed that Misuratis felt was fast enough.
Brief Notes on Specific Tools
Skype: Communications Backbone of the Libyan Opposition
Of all the online communications tools used in the Libyan revolution, Skype 
distinguished itself as a near ubiquitous presence in operations rooms, 
media centers, and news desks. Skype is a powerful and free VOIP video 
call and chat client that is used by more than half a billion people around 
the globe.127 It remained visible throughout the Arab Spring, notably as a 
frequently mentioned means by which interviews with opposition supporters 
were conducted. Skype similarly played a key public role in connecting 
journalists to sources throughout Libya and was a frequent presence in 
news reporting. Fighters and opposition supporters were interviewed live 
and with delays over Skype video. As stories developed or news broke, 
reporters regularly messaged contacts on the ground and in the opposition. 
Out of the public eye, Skype played an essential role, permitting what many 
opposition supporters saw as a reasonably secure means for text, voice, and 
video communications. Its functionality permitted both person-to-person 
calls and textual conversations, as well as group chats, some of which lasted for 
weeks, and which opposition supporters sometimes used as clearinghouses 
for information and news.128 It was believed that Skype-encrypted chat or 
voice communication could not be intercepted by LAJ security forces.129
Skype allowed opposition supporters from towns separated from each 
other by regime-controlled areas to communicate, coordinate strategy, and 
share information. It also proved to be a highly effective tool in connecting 
Libyans with opposition supporters throughout the diaspora. It was exten-
sively used, for example, alongside satellite phones to coordinate aid needs 
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for Libyan-operated aid and material support to the city of Misurata. As one 
Misurati reflected, “If it wasn’t for the Internet and Skype, the world would 
have never heard of anything that went on in Misurata. . . . thank God they 
couldn’t cut it off.” 130 
During the fighting in Misurata, the absence of a wireless network infrastruc-
ture, as well as the limited number of satellite phones and the difficulty using 
them, meant that Skype was used “even to call someone three km away.” A 
Misurati explained that “even after” radios and other communications tools 
became more readily available, Skype’s convenience as well as the perception 
of its security kept it as one of the dominant communications tools: “We 
knew that radios were not secure.” They were sure the LAJ forces were listening 
to them. Misurati opposition fighters, according to several sources, used 
mostly unencrypted, unscrambled radios. If a boat was coming or leaving, 
“they wouldn’t say it on the radio . . . they would do it on [Skype].” 131 The 
limited number of encrypted radios on both sides meant that fighters could 
listen in on the channels used by the other side. Misurati fighters and some 
fighters active in the Nafusa Mountains appear to have responded to this 
problem by adopting various code words and phrases and, in some cases 
among Amazigh populations, using distinctive and highly localized dialects 
that even nearby communities might have difficulty understanding.132 
Skype conference calls also provided what many perceived as a secure 
mechanism to engage in coordinating strategy; one source recalls conference 
calls on strategy between Benghazi, Troubrouk, Misurata, and Tripoli.133 
Vignette: Skype in Bani Waleed
As several Misuratis have described,134 a key tipping point in the Bani 
Waleed conflict was the provision of VSAT systems and Skype installations 
to three forward operations rooms established in Zawiya and Tarhuna, as 
well as a main operations room in Tajoura. Prior to the installation of these 
operations rooms, fighters from Zawiya, Tarhuna, Tajoura, and Bani Waleed 
were fighting largely independently on different fronts. The establishment of 
communications rooms allowed the fighters to better coordinate their ad-
vances. It also provided them with a link to opposition members in Benghazi, 
who maintained direct contact with NATO. Between operations rooms, and 
between the main operations room and Benghazi, communications took place 
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mostly via Skype calls. Communications between fighters and operations 
rooms was via unencrypted radio, using verbal codes. While the outcome 
of the battle reflected many factors, LAJ forces’ resistance was  overcome 
just one week after these coordination mechanism were put in place, and the 
town became free.
Facebook Groups 
While Facebook was extensively used to publicly post and share information 
and rich media about the revolution, the wide scope of Facebook use and the 
presence of many Libyan opposition actors on Facebook made it possible to 
benefit from another element of the site’s functionality: groups. Facebook 
offers users the powerful ability to quickly create groups with several layers 
of privacy protection and secrecy, including open, closed, and secret groups. 
Closed (administrator consent required for entry) and secret (invitation 
only, not publicly listed) groups, for example, were frequently used for a wide 
range of Libyan opposition activities, from communicating with selected 
foreign correspondents and sharing breaking news to political discussions 
to coordinating information about logistical needs. It is difficult to survey 
the full range of these activities because of their private and invitation-only 
nature. Nevertheless, it can be generally observed that Facebook provided a 
convenient mechanism for what was clearly an ad hoc and highly spatially 
distributed network of opposition supporters in the diaspora and others on 
the ground to converge in nonpublic, moderated spaces and coordinate their 
activities. Groups on Facebook made it possible for a wide range of actors 
who had access to specific resources to monitor a constant flow of informa-
tion about resource needs and resource availability, including humanitarian 
assistance, logistics, lobbying, opportunities for media contact, and so on. 
Supporters could be introduced to these groups if they had a specific set of 
resources or requests, and if they were considered trustworthy. 
Online E-Mail
E-mail accounts could not replace the one-to-many functionality of a tool 
like Facebook. Similarly, e-mails couldn’t reproduce the low-latency com-
munications functionality offered by Skype during a time of uncertain 
communications. Not only was voice a more comfortable medium for 
many Libyan opposition actors, but as one opposition member explained, 
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it wasn’t always possible to determine that a message had been read  
immediately. Still, e-mail could be used to transmit data and attachments  
in parallel with Skype calls, for example, and it was clearly useful for a 
number of activities where information was intended for a small set of 
recipients but attachments and other tools were necessary. A Skype call, 
for example, could provide information about a target set, and an e-mail 
follow-up could provide the coordinates and the details. 
Prior to the revolution, a Hotmail or Gmail account might have been used 
for a mixture of business and personal activities. During the uprising, some 
Libyan opposition supporters continued to use personal accounts that had  
been established well before the 2011 uprising, but transformed them 
into tools of war fighting, coordination, media connections, and strategic 
communication. The same Hotmail or Yahoo! account might now also be 
used to communicate with international media, share documents and other 
materials within the opposition, coordinate humanitarian aid, and even 
interact with weapons suppliers or opposition members communicating 
with NATO. Many more accounts were created, often pseudonymously, 
and served similar functions. 
Discussion Questions
1.   How did networks of support and trust expand the Libyan opposition’s 
access to resources? Were these networks complemented by social media?
2.   How did NATO publicly explain how it was using social media? What 
are some of the ways that this might have shaped how the Libyan oppo-
sition used social media? What were some of the risks to this kind  
of disclosure?
3.   What are two ways that particularly struck or surprised you about how 
the opposition used common tools to communicate? What kinds of 
functionality do these tools have that might not be found in their  
military equivalents? What do they lack?
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Inherent Risks: Monitoring and Attacks 
Pre-Revolution Monitoring at Home and Abroad
It was clear to Libyans before the 2011 revolution that political speech tied 
to one’s name could be dangerous. Journalists and online commentators 
might be summoned for questioning or detained as “Internet prisoners” as 
a consequence of their writings published online.137 One Libyan detained 
by the intelligence services, for example, was shown his correspondence 
with Libyan exile political organizations, along with pseudonyms he had 
used to publish abroad. In another case, a Libyan journalist was arrested 
as he prepared to meet a dissident contact he had known only by e-mail 
communication.138 Even for dissidents abroad, criticism could be danger-
ous. Historically, Gaddafi’s operatives had been known to strike dissidents 
overseas, in 1984 firing on a demonstration in front of the Libyan embassy 
in London in an incident that cost the life of a British police constable. In 
ensuing years, the Gaddafi regime used other tools to apply pressure on 
those who disagreed with them, making the regime an international pariah 
and encouraging legitimate fear of its ability to reach dissidents abroad or 
their families back home.
Although Libyans readily describe their perceptions that the regime engaged 
in some Internet filtering and monitoring, direct information about how 
the monitoring took place was largely unavailable prior to the 2011 revolution. 
Evidence for the most unsophisticated forms of monitoring was sometimes 
publicly visible: a 2009 Open Network Initiative (ONI) report on Libya139 
noted that visible surveillance was often present at Internet cafes. Beyond 
the direct presence of surveillance agents, the report noted, Internet cafes 
were encouraged to undertake their own self-monitoring. Some Internet 
filtering was also observed. The ONI identified evidence of somewhat limited 
and unsophisticated efforts of content filtering by the Gaddafi regime.140 
These seemed limited to a select group of targeted political websites, as 
well as websites linked to Libya’s Amazigh (Berber) minority. The same 
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report also noted cases of political websites being hacked and their content 
replaced with pro-Gaddafi materials between 2008 and 2009.141 
Regime Monitoring and Hacking Prior to the Revolution: 
What We Know
After the fall of Tripoli to opposition forces, Libyans made many startling 
discoveries about the secret parts of Gaddafi’s regime. Concealed tunnel 
networks under Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli, opulent homes, and signs of 
decadence and eccentricities all emerged as fighters, reporters, and everyday 
Libyans passed through the doors of hastily abandoned buildings and com-
pounds. Amidst emptied detention cells and piles of dossiers were discovered 
sophisticated Internet and telecommunications monitoring gear.
When reporters for the Wall Street Journal entered one of these locations 
after Tripoli’s fall, they spotted and photographed a sign on the wall: “Help 
keep our classified business secret. Don’t discuss classified information out 
of the HQ.” The culture of secrecy in the intelligence services was highly 
effective. Beyond the sense that they were being monitored, the public 
appears to have not known a central core of the Gaddafi regime’s Internet 
monitoring capabilities: Libya had purchased most of its network monitor-
ing gear from large Western and Asian companies. The logo of one of them, 
Amesys, was visible in the upper left corner of the sign. The first public 
evidence for the presence of foreign companies may have emerged during  
a BBC report in which Amesys’s name was visible.142 A picture quickly grew 
of a surprising range of international companies that had provided tools to 
support telecommunications interceptions. 
Two major monitoring systems have been publicly identified at the time 
of writing: the Amesys EAGLE system and the ZTE monitoring system. 
Reporters and others investigating these systems encountered a range of 
other equipment also supplied by international companies that provided 
further interception capabilities, including cellular, international, and  
satellite phone interception and tracking. 
The Amesys EAGLE System
The EAGLE system cost the Libyan government approximately €10 
million, and began to be installed in late July 2008, according to a person 
involved in its installation.143 The installation of the product in Libya was a 
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collaboration, as well as a test. Libya would be an “interesting laboratory” 
and a test bed for this system, allowing the company to test out its systems 
without limitations. The system was installed by French Amesys,145 which 
describes itself as a multi-sector “Critical Systems Architect,” which was at 
the time a subsidiary of the French company Bull.
The same source describes the interception as capturing 98% of Internet 
traffic in Libya from a small number of capture points: 
We did massive [interception]: we intercepted all the data passing through 
the [Libyan] Internet: e-mails, chats, Internet browsing, Voice Over IP.146 
The surveillance apparatus had a three-tiered organizational structure. 
At the lowest levels were “basic operators” who were assigned to follow 
suspects and prepare reports. Basic operators would identify suspects based 
on key words and other behavior of interest in the massive traffic flow: 
“for example, how to put a university under interception and find suspects 
based on key words.” 147 
Above the basic operators were officers, at least 20, who were charged with 
defining keywords and surveillance priorities. These individuals operated 
Poster found on the wall of a Gaddafi regime monitoring facility HQ 2 
with the Amesys logo in the corner.144
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out of three sites in Tripoli: one for the army, another for the police, and a 
third belonging to an unspecified part of the government. At the highest 
level, French military officers as well as Bull executives maintained contact 
with Abdullah Senussi, the head of Libya’s intelligence services, who was 
involved in negotiating the interception product’s functionality. The system 
made it possible to rapidly create and examine social network diagrams of 
targets’ communications activities, examining the frequency of their com-
munications with other actors.
According to the source, while the EAGLE system was turned on in August 
2008, it suffered a number of crashes and setbacks before became fully 
operational in the beginning of 2010.
EAGLE promotional materials leaked into the public domain lay out what 
the system is capable of intercepting:
[M]ore than 300 different network protocols including mail protocols 
(SMTP, POP3, IMAP . . .), Voice over IP conversations (SIP, H323, RTP, 
RTCP . . .), webmail transactions (Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail . . .), or chat 
conversations (MSN, AIM, Yahoo! . . .). All of them are classified thanks 
to advanced techniques based on protocol syntax analysis (Deep Packet 
Inspection), whereas competitive products do it through network port 
identification that can easily be misled.148 
In other words, the program can recognize and intercept the kind of traffic 
associated with each of the following activities:
 •  E-mail accessed by client software like Outlook, Thunderbird, or
  Eudora 
 •  VOIP calls (although encrypted calls like Skype are not mentioned)
 •  Web browsing
 •  Online e-mails
 •  Chat programs like Microsoft Messenger, Yahoo! Chat, and AOL 
  Instant Messenger
When installed on Libya’s network, such a system could provide the Gaddafi 
regime’s intelligence services with comprehensive access to a wide range of 
Libyan citizens’ online activities.149 
Interestingly, the leaked manual contained instructional material based on 
a real-world case: Libya, which Amesys had improperly redacted. OWNI 
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removed the redactions and found a list of dozens of e-mail addresses that 
were determined to be part of Mahmoud Al-Nakoua’s contact list. Then 
72, Al-Nakoua was a well-known Libyan exile and head of the opposition 
group the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. His contact list included 
Atia Lawgali, then 60, who played a founding role in establishing the  
opposition’s National Transitional Council; Aly Ramadan Abuzaakouk,  
a well-known Libyan pro-democracy activist and operator of Transparency-
Libya.com (now defunct); and Ashour Al Shamis, who operated the dissident 
Akhbar-Libya.com (also now defunct).150 The OWNI investigation high-
lighted that Al Shamis and Abuzaakouk had both received funding from 
the National Endowment for Democracy, two of whose employees’ e-mail 
addresses also appear on the list. Their funding included support for securing 
their communications from hacking and electronic attacks. 
The ZTE ZXMT System
The second known monitoring center, installed in a building camouflaged 
under the bland name of the African Communication Center, was reported 
to exist by former LTT employees, but was only directly described by 
Matthiew Aikins in a May 2012 article.151 This section highlights findings 
and materials from his reporting. 
In photos of the equipment provided to Aikins by Human Rights Watch,152 
it is possible to identify equipment bearing the markings of the Zhongxing 
Telecommunication Equipment Corporation (ZTE), one of China’s largest 
telecommunications companies. The large rack-mounted equipment in 
the monitoring center appears to have been built around the ZTE ZXMT 
interception product.153 Information about the ZXMT system primarily 
comes from promotional materials and a presentation about the system 
apparently prepared for a potential Iranian client,154 as well as photographs 
of the original monitoring center. 
ZTE describes the system as their “turn-key,” carrier-class lawful interception 
solution, a “vendor-independent” monitoring system with “powerful 
interoperability.” ZTE highlights its ability to monitor communications 
across a class of products, including the PTSN network, mobile network 
(2G, 2.5G) the Internet network, and NGN networks.
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The photographs show that a technician appears to have helpfully labeled 
the servers with ZTE-branded stickers, listing a number of intercept features 
similar to those offered by Amesys: HTTP, POP3, FTP, IMAP, Telnet, 
Text FTP, Yahoo Messenger, and so on. Other photographs might have 
revealed more capabilities, but from these images we can draw a picture 
similar to that of Amesys. This system appears capable of intercepting:
 • E-mail accessed by client software like Outlook, Thunderbird,
  or Eudora 
 •  Web browsing
 •  File transfers
 •  Online e-mails
 •  Chat programs like Yahoo! Chat
In addition to the system’s interception capabilities, photographic evidence 
shows that it is capable of storing intercepted material, making it possible to 
Figure 6.1  Page 68 of the ZTE marketing presentation shows the broad outlines 
of the system. It is likely that the images provided to Aikins include the 
data network interception module, labeled DIM here.
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subject the material to historical link analysis, and data mining. Unfortunately, 
little further information clarifying the command and control structure 
of the ZXMT monitoring system, target nominating, and monitoring is 
available in the public domain.
A Note on Other Forms of Monitoring
Evidence has emerged and been widely documented confirming Libyans’ 
perceptions that the regime was monitoring telephone and cellular commu-
nications. Equipment capable of monitoring and tracking cellular telephones, 
landlines, and Thuraya-brand satellite telephones was found when monitoring 
centers were entered by opposition fighters.155 Aikins describes mercenaries 
deployed in a kindergarten:
Ukrainian mercenaries set up shop in a kindergarten, right around the 
corner from the intelligence headquarters; from there they snooped on 
sat-phone traffic using frequency scanners. Gadhafi had declared that  
anyone caught with a satellite phone could be sentenced to death.156 
Practical evidence for the application of this equipment isn’t hard to come 
by. In one report, two individuals were detained only four hours after call-
ing a foreign correspondent from a Tripoli-based cellphone.157 Monitoring 
equipment included multiple interception and call recording platforms 
for both domestic and international phone calls. The Wall Street Journal has 
reported that 30 million to 40 million minutes of mobile and landline phone 
calls were recorded and stored each month with interception equipment 
supplied by VASTech, a South African company that offers an intercept 
system that provides both massive interception and retention, and link 
analysis functionality.158 Another company whose technology was reportedly 
in active use in Libya is Thales, which has developed a massive interception 
system called the National Platform for Legal Interception (Platforme  
Nationale des Interceptions Judiciares), or PNIJ. The PNIJ was developed for 
eventual nationwide deployment in France, but was first “commercialized” to 
Libya in 2008 without certain (presumably legal) protections for citizens 
planned in its French application.159 
Satellite phone calls similarly were not immune. Photographs acquired 
by Human Rights Watch indicate that the LAJ likely possessed satellite 
telephony monitoring equipment developed by L3 Communications, an 
American company.160 
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Electronic Operations by the LAJ Against the Libyan Opposition
When the LAJ turned off the Internet and Libya’s other telecommunications 
networks, it may have hoped to strike a mortal blow against the growth of 
an increasingly interconnected opposition. But it didn’t. Turning off the 
Internet drove Libyans en masse to connect to the Internet in ways that  
totally bypassed Libyan networks and the powerful Amesys EAGLE and 
ZTE ZXMT monitoring systems that operated on them. By connecting  
via VSAT services whose earth stations were outside Libya, the opposition  
dramatically shifted the balance of information about their activities  
toward greater privacy and resistance to interception by Gaddafi’s regime.161 
Cutting landline and cellular phone service further neutralized the regime’s 
own listening apparatus, with the possible exception of Tripoli and other 
areas in the east where the phone networks remained active. There too, the 
Libyan opposition moved its communications toward more decentralized 
means of communications, substituting Skype for VSAT and satellite tele-
phones or what had previously been phone calls, and later moving some 
communications onto restored, local communications networks in Benghazi 
and Misurata.
The Gaddafi regime’s response? Try to hack the users and their websites. This 
section describes how the Gaddafi regime, supported by pro-government  
electronic actors, worked to exploit vulnerabilities in the ways that Libyans 
had reconnected themselves. Information about this phenomenon is 
documented in only a few places. As a result, much of this section relies on 
conversations with Libyans, as well as analysis of malware that they were sent. 
Pro-Government Electronic Actors
Long before the fighting concluded, Libyans realized that their Internet 
use was under some kind of attack. Social media sites of opposition groups 
and individuals were sometimes hijacked and defaced with pro-Gaddafi 
imagery, online e-mail accounts were lost, and Skype accounts hijacked. At 
some point in spring 2011, Libyans more familiar with information tech-
nology began noticing that their friends’ accounts were sending them small 
files they suspected might be malicious. Several key opposition websites also 
began behaving strangely, serving similarly suspicious files to the browsers 
that visited them. It is clear today that this reflected the efforts of pro-
government electronic actors (PGEAs)162 on behalf of the LAJ to regain 
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visibility on the communications and command and control activities of 
the Libyan opposition. 
Who was doing the hacking? Patchy information has emerged about the 
Libyan side of this effort. Since the end of the fighting, employees of Libya’s 
Internet provider LTT have described a room operated by the Interior 
Ministry where hacking took place. They have also described efforts to recruit 
hackers from overseas, including China and Eastern Europe, to engage in 
phishing campaigns and develop malware that could provide them with 
access to targeted computers.163 The group that these former employees have 
offered a glimpse of may have been an organization known as the Libyan 
Electronic Army (LEA), which maintained a public presence by hijacking 
and defacing opposition social media sites, as well as other information  
operations activities.164 In fact, the LEA maintained several locations 
Figure 6.2  Potential, simplified command and control hierarchy of the Libyan Electronic Army 
for one LEA unit (of which there were reportedly at least three). Although the diagram 
indicates a fixed set of relationships, the LEA was not static.
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throughout Tripoli, and appears to have operated with a sizeable base of 
volunteers and professional staff. Reportedly created at the urging of Mo-
hamed Gaddafi, it grew increasingly formalized as the conflict progressed. 
(For information about the origins, background, and possible structure of 
the LEA, see Appendix C.) 
The story of one, clearly junior, member of the LEA provides us with some 
insight into both the motivations that could lead someone to join the LEA 
and the way it worked:
Nadia (not her real name) volunteered for the Electronic Army to protect 
herself after her uncle was arrested for helping protestors during the 
demonstrations . . . she submitted her ID papers and was accepted . . . she  
would go in whenever she felt like it to work at a three-story electronics 
factory in a suburb of Tripoli that housed one of the three wartime offices 
of the Electronic Army. She and the other volunteers would sit at the 40 
or so PCs in the office, making pro-Gadhafi images, posting propaganda 
videos, and creating dozens of fake accounts to leave comments online.165 
“Nadia” also illustrated the problems of morale and personnel that clearly 
beset the effort:
[A]fter a while Nadia realized that the whole thing was a bit of a joke. 
Many members of the Electronic Army, she soon learned, were there 
largely because it was the only way to get Internet access in Tripoli  
during the war.166 
While most of its members apparently were volunteers, the group also 
clearly employed the services of some professionals, including non-Libyans 
as well as Libyans overseas. Volunteers are reported to have been vetted 
with a background questionnaire, although not all of them were primarily 
motivated by patriotism.167
Seeming to confirm the limited skill and focus of the group of PGEAs, the 
Cyber Security Forum Initiative’s April 2011 study of Libyan cyber security 
asserted that the primary focus of the relatively small number of regime 
supporters or “mercenary” hackers was defacing websites and concluded: 
“Gaddafi seems to lack internal state-supported hackers.”168 This appears to 
have been only partially correct: much of the hacking that took place during 
the revolution required little technical skill, and many of the activities of 
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PGEAs were limited to creating social media profiles that they used to post 
pro-Gaddafi material, deface websites, and flood the comments sections of 
opposition social media sites with pro-Gaddafi commentary. The Patriots  
of Misratah website is one of many examples: hijacked from a Misurata media 
group, it was hacked with pro-regime commentary and imagery.
Beyond public defacements, however, the LEA spent much of the revolution 
systematically attacking and compromising private communications networks 
and computers of the Libyan opposition.169 According to a Libyan telecom-
munications engineer familiar with the matter, the more sophisticated 
members of the LEA have largely fled or gone into hiding, a claim that 
Aikins echoes. According to the same engineer, some are now among the 
post-revolution government’s list of wanted individuals.170 
Patriots of Misratah Facebook site as it appeared in spring 2012, 
still visibly defaced by pro-Gaddafi propaganda. 
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Non-Libyan PGEAs located outside the country may have taken part in 
actions against the Libyan opposition; however, evidence for this is very 
limited. Serbian Internet supporters of Gaddafi, for example, are believed 
by some to have been active in creating a wave of online social media–based 
pro-regime messaging, as well as claiming credit for defacing a number of 
opposition websites.171 
Websites Hacked
A number of the highest-profile opposition websites, including EnoughGad-
dafi and feb17.info, were subjected to several kinds of attack. Although none 
was successful in permanently rendering the pages un-visitable, the attacks 
degraded the ability of the website operators to engage in effective messaging, 
and in at least one case may have exposed a site’s visitors to malicious code. In 
the early days of the uprising, several pro-opposition pages were the targets 
of distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), temporarily making it 
impossible to visit them.172 Briefly, these attacks use a large number of 
computers (often machines compromised by malware and incorporated into 
a network of compromised machines, controlled by a remote attacker) to  
simultaneously generate an overwhelming amount of traffic to a specific page. 
If the attack is done correctly, the server(s) hosting the page will be unable to 
cope with the traffic, rendering the page un-visitable. 
Later, the attacks took a more sophisticated direction: the websites of 
EnoughGaddafi.com and feb17.info were attacked based on an exploitation 
of vulnerabilities in their coding. The attack was used to compromise and 
modify material hosted on the sites, as well as to implant a piece of malware 
that vulnerable computers’ browsers would automatically download. This 
malware was described as a remote access tool that would permit eavesdropping 
on keystrokes and audio, and presumably offer full access to file systems.173 
Still other attacks involved using changing the domain registration of a 
prominent opposition website, again temporarily making it impossible for 
users to access the site.
Electronic Attacks Against Individual Libyans
A wide range of the attacks against Libyans can be categorized as account 
compromises. Without access to the servers and computers used to orches-
revolutionary risks  81
trate these attacks, their full scale and their success rate are likely to remain 
known only to PGEAs. Nevertheless, almost all of the Libyans engaged 
in the opposition and consulted for this case study could recall cases of 
friends and others who had various accounts hijacked during the course of 
the revolution. While it is likely that some accounts were compromised via 
insecure passwords or easily guessable account recovery questions, the most 
direct evidence comes from analysis of samples of malware sent by com-
promised accounts. Once an individual’s computer was infected, any of the 
accounts that they connected to was likely to be compromised, including 
chat programs, Skype, e-mail, and Facebook. 
LTT employees have described a desire on the part of the Libyan regime to 
compromise and monitor Skype communications.174 This desire was similar, 
no doubt, to that of the Egyptian government, which at the time of its own 
revolution was considering the purchase of a half-million-dollar package 
that would provide it with access to the contents of Skype calls, among 
other things.175 
Skype was an understandable target for the Gaddafi regime: it had become 
a central tool of opposition communications networks and was widely 
believed to be secure from LAJ interception. Indeed, Skype’s encryption, 
even when traveling across regime-controlled networks, would have probably 
frustrated attempts at interception, as there is no evidence that the Gaddafi 
regime was able to decrypt Skype communications. Additionally, Skype 
communications over VSAT systems meant that the opposition’s traffic 
exited the VSAT network at ground stations outside Libya, further limiting 
what could be observed. Yet, as the conflict demonstrates, it was quite 
possible to use social engineering to accomplish some of the same ends. 
Although it is unclear how the wave of hacking began, its outlines can be 
described. Skype users whose computers had been compromised would 
find their accounts hijacked. The hijacked account, operated by PGEAs, 
would begin sending contextually relevant messages to accounts on the 
compromised users’ contact lists. These messages would be followed by a 
file transfer, with files sometimes titled in ways that appeared relevant to 
previous chat transcripts. The files were malicious, however, designed to 
provide access to compromised machines. This access included the ability 
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to monitor activity on the machines, as well as enabling their microphones. 
In this way a target’s Skype communications could be intercepted before 
they left the computer, and then covertly exfiltrated to those conducting 
the monitoring from the target computer.
The wave of hacking through Skype, and the use of compromised accounts, 
fueled another kind of paranoia. As one opposition member wrote while 
the conflict was still underway: 
I panicked. What if the person on the screen wasn’t really who I thought 
he was? What if some security apparatus had hacked his account? Should 
I really be chatting to him?176 
To encourage paranoia, the LAJ leadership chose to exploit its access to 
certain Skype calls, including playing the audio of Skype calls on state  
television and claiming the ability to intercept them. 
Electronic Attacks Against Journalists
The targeting of the Libyan opposition by PGEAs was just one way in 
which the LAJ attempted to access communications pertinent to the 
conflict. Former Gaddafi regime officials with access to materials from the 
Libyan intelligence services have described efforts to compromise reporters’ 
accounts. One example, a video sent to journalists purporting to depict hu-
man rights abuses in Tripoli, actually contained a remote-access Trojan. A 
former regime official noted that the attacks against journalists were largely 
unsophisticated, yet effective inasmuch as targeted individuals were willing 
to execute the content: “The problem wasn’t the sophistication of the tools, 
but rather the lack of knowledge of the reporters.” 177 
Friendly contacts within the Gaddafi regime sometimes tipped off pro-
opposition figures about material exfiltrated from reporters’ computers. 
One of these documents included an in-country source list for CNN. That 
document was clearly confidential and directly stated the concern of those 
using it that the contacts were both sensitive and closely held. A CNN  
official acknowledged that there had been a “possible breach” and noted his 
belief that “many sources who were speaking to these correspondents have 
been captured or killed.” 178 
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Malware Samples from PGEA Attacks: An Analysis
Samples of the malicious software deployed against several Libyan opposition 
targets have been collected and analyzed. This section briefly describes the 
analysis of these files by a security researcher, highlighting the capabilities  
of the underlying remote-access Trojan/remote administration tool.179  
Importantly, antivirus detection on the samples when initially deployed 
was quite low, meaning that most antivirus programs would not have  
recognized them as malicious.
Two files sent by the compromised accounts of the individual described 
below in Case 1 were saved by two contacts who received them. They are 
remote-access Trojans, programs that provide a remote individual access to 
key functions of the targeted computer. These programs, frequently used as 
part of cyber-criminal activity, can be acquired online from a shadowy  
community of developers and programmers. 
Analysis reveals that the files were first compiled in early May 2011, shortly 
before they were sent to the target computer. Once executed by the user, 
either file places a file named Windowsdef.exe onto the target system. 
This file functions as a keylogger, capturing the user’s typing. The program 
modifies the Windows registry to ensure that it is executed each time the 
user logs in, modifies Windows Explorer to give the program the ability to 
access files and run programs, and monitors the user by activating the web-
cam and microphone. It also modifies the Windows firewall to allow itself 
to connect out of the computer, masquerading as Windows Messenger. The 
program also checks the IP address of the compromised machine, provid-
ing the attackers with information about the machine’s location.
Example Cases of Account Compromise
To illustrate the types of compromise that took place during the conflict, 
this section briefly provides anonymized descriptions of Libyan opposition 
members who were successfully targeted by electronic attack.180 
Case 1 
Location: Western Libya 
Connection: VSAT 
Route of Compromise: Likely Trojan  
Known Compromised Accounts : Skype, Facebook, online e-mail 
84  irregular warfare studies 
Consequences: Degraded communications ability, loss of secrecy, infection 
of other accounts 
Compromised Accounts Used?: Malware sent, targeted to contact list
The individual in this case played a central role in both aid and arms pro-
curement in his city, and also acted as an information clearinghouse for aid 
and material requirements. Additionally, he played a role in hosting NATO 
liaison personnel. The first evidence of compromise showed in his inability 
to access his online e-mail account. Shortly thereafter, several of his contacts 
observed that his Skype account was sending out a series of suspicious files 
to his contacts. These file names included gaddafigooglemaps.exe, gadaffi-
maps.exe, misrataaid.exe, misratadeaths.exe, and natocontacts.exe. 
Each of these names alluded to a feature of this person’s activities that the 
attackers had presumably discovered. Sent to an unsuspecting contact, 
the files might easily have been executed. The compromise of some of his 
friends’ accounts shortly thereafter indicated that this may have happened.  
It was later determined that his computer had been infected by several  
remote-access Trojans. Given the nature of this individual’s activities, as 
well as the physical location of his computer in a highly protected area in 
which sensitive operational discussions were held, the machine may have 
provided a substantial window into the military and aid activities of the 
opposition in his city. 
Gaddafigooglemaps.exe has been identified as the remote-access Trojan 
Blackshades NET, a sophisticated commercial Trojan easily available for 
purchase online with a rich set of functionality that permits a wide range  
of potentially illegal activities, including remote surveillance.181 Interestingly, 
Blackshades NET has re-emerged approximately one year later, deployed 
against members of the Syrian opposition by Syrian PGEAs.182 
Case 2 
Location: Western Libya 
Connection: VSAT 
Route of Compromise: Unknown 
Known Compromised Accounts: Facebook, online e-mail, MSN 
Consequences: Degraded communications ability, loss of secrecy 
Compromised Accounts Used?: Facebook account defaced with  
pro-Gaddafi material; pro-Gaddafi messages sent to contacts via e-mail
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This individual played a number of roles in the opposition. A professional 
with good English and a flair for speaking with the press, he was a frequent 
source for international reporting. He also served as an emissary for the 
military council of his city and was directly involved in overseeing the 
assembling and transmission of targeting information to NATO contacts. 
His e-mail was a key component of this work: the same account not only 
served as a way to arrange interviews and communicate while overseas, it 
also served as his tool for transmitting coordinates and target descriptions. 
The first evidence that he was a target came when his MSN Messenger 
contacts “vanished” one day early in the uprising. After deciding that MSN 
was unsafe, he continued to use his e-mail account until he found himself 
unable to gain access. Shortly thereafter, his e-mail account appears to have 
been used to gain access to his Facebook page, which was subsequently 
defaced with pro-Gaddafi images, slogans, and disinformation. Although 
he received no information that his accounts were sending malware, he 
learned that his Hotmail account was used to send pro-Gaddafi messages 
to his contact list. He described the loss of his online e-mail account, along 
with the connectivity that it provided, as devastating.
Given the nature of his activities, it is likely that his account would have 
provided a detailed window into key aspects and individuals involved in the 
targeting process, as well as communications with various parties providing 
support to the opposition.
Case 3 
Location: Western Libya 
Connection: VSAT 
Route of Compromise: Unknown, possibly via malicious use of  
account recovery 
Known Compromised Accounts: YouTube, online e-mail 
Consequences: Degraded communications ability, inability to communicate 
with journalists, loss of secrecy, possible disclosure of identity 
Compromised Accounts: Made inaccessible 
Compromised Accounts Used?: None observed
This very high-profile activist experienced the loss of his Gmail account, 
which was tied to his widely viewed YouTube account. Loss of access to these 
accounts made it impossible for the activist to post high-impact videos. It 
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also led to the possibility that his full identity, which had been camouflaged, 
might be revealed by the e-mail traffic contained in the account. He later 
discovered that information likely exfiltrated from his account, including 
identifying information about individuals he had been in contact with, were 
present in his file in Libyan state security. When access to the account was 
later recovered, it became apparent that it had been accessed by a computer 
with a Libyan IP address, strongly indicating that the compromise may have 
originated within Libya.
Discussion Questions
1.   How did the Libyan opposition’s forced switch to two-way satellite 
Internet and other connectivity impact the level of visibility that the 
LAJ had on Libyan network communications? 
2.   What strategies did the LAJ undertake to regain access to Libyan  
opposition communications?
3.   The LAJ deployed PGEAs to hack the opposition’s communications. 
What factors do you suspect contributed to their success in penetrating in 
some cases? What factors might have protected other opposition members?
4.   PGEAs used inexpensive commercial malware designed for cybercrime 
and simple hacking techniques. Should these be considered “poor 
man’s cyber weapons”? Why or why not?
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The Libyan opposition’s ability to rebound from a complete Internet and 
communications blackout illustrates its immense value to an opposition 
movement in an asymmetric conflict. The remarkably diverse ways they used 
their regained Internet connectivity helped them overcome substantial 
asymmetries in access to resources and communications networks. Yet many 
of the opposition’s ad hoc communications networks and the ways in which 
it reconnected guided both individuals and groups into a series of practices 
that did little to mitigate the asymmetries of risk between it and the LAJ. 
While these risks were not fatal to the opposition’s success, NATO support 
likely buffered the opposition from some of the greatest vulnerabilities 
introduced by weak operational security. This discussion will briefly high-
light these themes before concluding with a discussion of the implications 
of this case for future conflicts.
By being forced to move into Internet connectivity and communications 
that the LAJ could not observe, the opposition ended up achieving greater 
security for their communications. They may have enhanced this in specific 
instances by their preference for tools like Skype, which the LAJ was probably 
unable to un-encrypt. Yet, as the previous section illustrates, host-level 
security remained almost completely unaddressed.
The ways that the Libyan opposition used social media and the Internet 
made it possible for a geographically distributed group of Libyans, both 
in-country and in the diaspora, to contribute to many aspects of the fight, 
and to do so while benefitting from the often-rich situational awareness 
offered by groups that served as information clearinghouses. This kind of 
fusion of information, needs, tactics, and strategizing made it easier for 
information to reach the right people. It also meant that decisions could be 
made with surprising responsiveness and with the benefit of a great deal of 
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situational awareness. Information, however, was also much less compart-
mentalized and hence more vulnerable to access by the “wrong” people. 
The price of operational security was clearly not fully appreciated. 
Comprehensive Vulnerability
Throughout the conflict, many Libyan opposition actors sought to protect 
their identities or conceal key features of their activities from LAJ security 
services. In areas that were under LAJ control, opposition actors faced  
imprisonment, physical violence, torture, and possible death for their  
activities. Even in areas militarily under their own control or otherwise  
denied to the LAJ, opposition actors still risked reprisals to family members, 
as well as the operational security risk that their actions could provide the 
LAJ with sensitive information.
It is important to note how serious the operational security risks were with 
the use of social media accounts to engage in opposition activities, and how 
imperfectly these risks were mitigated. When the revolution began, many 
opposition members turned to pre-existing networks of friends, neighbors, 
and associates. This often meant using familiar tools that could be quickly 
accessed, including existing social media and e-mail accounts. 
Keeping old accounts and online identities associated with real names or 
consistent aliases from before the revolution was, of course, convenient and 
efficient: e-mail accounts and social media profiles are a repository of 
contacts and other personal information. Changing or discarding accounts 
could mean becoming unreachable by old contacts. Many in the opposition 
also engaged in a wide range of posting and other public or semi-public com-
munications in support of the opposition on social media, using the same 
accounts that they used for more sensitive activities. These practices made 
them vulnerable to discovery and unmasking. Even when members adopted 
pseudonyms for more sensitive activities, they often communicated with 
Libyans who did not disguise their online identities.
All of these activities made the Libyan opposition networks, groups, and 
individuals highly vulnerable to a range of straightforward network analyses, 
targeting, and attack. Even if specific individuals practiced consistently strong 
personal operational security, being an informed and contributing opposition 
supporter often required some degree of participation in social networks. 
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This kind of activity could in turn make the individual vulnerable to the 
weaker links of their network. 
The LAJ appears to have lost its access to sophisticated network analysis 
analytics through Amesys and ZTE monitoring equipment when it 
disabled the Internet, and it is unlikely that it was able to reproduce this 
level of automated analysis of the opposition based on the skills and resources 
of PGEA and the LAJ intelligence services. Nevertheless, the LAJ’s apparent 
ability to target specific high-value but not public targets, such as the 
Libyan described in Case 1, suggests that it successfully exploited some 
features of the opposition’s networks.
The accounts and computer of a single electronically compromised well-
connected opposition supporter could be, and likely were, exploited to gather 
information about that person’s entire network of contacts, associations, and 
communications on social media and to collect extensive information from 
groups to which they belonged. The participants and the entire transcript 
of an invitation-only or closed Facebook group could, for example, be viewed 
from the beginning using a single compromised account. The same would 
have been true for Skype, e-mail, and other accounts.
Risks Never Addressed
When the Gaddafi regime cut the Internet, it inflicted a widely criticized 
blow against Libyans’ ability to communicate with each other and with the 
outside world. The regime was not able to keep Libyans offline for long, 
however. This case study tells the story, both within the public eye and far 
out of it, of how communications activities by the Libyan opposition were 
underpinned by a range of low-cost and decentralized technologies that often 
relied on Internet connectivity. The Internet didn’t just connect Libyans as 
individuals and groups to the Internet; it also connected them to diaspora 
Libyans, friendly countries, the world media, and many other key resources. 
By shutting down the Internet, the regime clearly hoped to stop the spread 
of rebellion, or perhaps to prevent information and documentation of its 
crackdown from reaching a global audience. In the process, the LAJ also 
completely disabled their pre-revolution Internet-monitoring infrastructure. 
But their efforts to regain a view of opposition communications didn’t cease. 
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Throughout the conflict, PGEAs, apparently operating under the direction of 
the LAJ or possibly the personalized supervision of Gaddafi’s son Mohamed, 
embarked on a multi-pronged electronic campaign against the Libyan 
opposition. They publicly harassed and attempted to counter-message the 
opposition. These attempts were often very crude, and did little to change the 
public image of the Gaddafi regime as a violent and unreasonable actor intent 
on silencing its citizens. Further from the public eye, PGEAs worked to hack 
and exploit opposition members’ accounts and planted tools that allowed them 
to exfiltrate sometimes highly sensitive information about their adversaries.
An ex-regime official noted that the wave of attacks was unsophisticated. 
Some targets recognized that they were being asked to execute malicious files 
and refrained from opening them, yet many others did not. Why would such 
an elementary security precaution be ignored? It appears that the emphasis 
after the Gaddafi regime shut down the regime was on connecting, not  
securing—on restoring connectivity through different tools outside the  
regime’s  control and on fighting battles. When they did reconnect, it 
was with the urgency of a group in mortal danger, intensely preoccupied 
with the ongoing fighting. As one Libyan put it, “If we were vulnerable 
we couldn’t care less . . . we were desperate to get our voices out . . . it was 
a matter of life or death . . . it was just vital to get this information out.” 183 
Although Libyans made highly effective use of the Internet in many spheres 
of the conflict, they did so with comparatively little understanding of how 
they themselves might be targeted online. 
Many Libyans entered the conflict with considerable know-how and resources 
to invest in restoring Internet connectivity but little experience in circum-
vention and security tools. Few had pre-revolution experience with trying to 
evade the regime’s censorship or monitoring. Although Internet monitoring 
was widely perceived to exist prior to the revolution, Libyans’ Internet usage 
had not been honed by the need to bypass extensive filtering or censorship.184 
The substantial breaches of operational security, personal safety, and source 
confidentiality described here should illustrate the extreme risks faced by 
opposition groups that use standard Internet tools and common operating 
systems. While they may be able to connect by a combination of strong 
motivation, resources, and ingenuity, security is another matter. 
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Although some in the Libyan opposition recognized the risk, this author has 
been unable to find any evidence of comprehensive threat modeling, audit-
ing, or mitigation strategies at any influential level beyond specific responses 
to individual attacks (e.g., on a website).
The impact of these electronic exploitations are hard to quantify. It is 
unclear how direct the intelligence-gathering linkages were between 
PGEAs and, say, officers engaged in battlefield strategy. Had the linkages 
been good, and had NATO airpower not been present to interdict certain 
troop movements, these exploitations might have influenced the outcomes 
of battles. It is not hard to imagine that had many of the compromised 
individuals not been physically located in areas denied to LAJ forces, they 
would have been likely targets for elimination.
Moving Forward
Lessons from the 2011 Libyan revolution are still being digested. The 
author hopes the reader will come away with a sense that LAJ attempts to 
hack and disrupt the opposition’s use of Internet technology were, although 
failures, something to be taken very seriously. At the time of writing, the 
Syrian opposition is using many of the same communications tools and 
practices as the Libyan opposition did. It is now abundantly clear that many 
of the same tactics that the Gaddafi regime used against Libyans, such as 
targeted malware and extensive attacks against social media activities, are 
being aggressively deployed by PGEAs in Syria. While the presence of 
NATO support for the Libyan opposition may have decisively tipped the 
battle in its favor, this support may also have masked just how risky some 
of the opposition’s communications practices really were. Figures in arms 
procurement, military planning, and aid in Misurata were hacked, and their 
computers were used to spy on them. If NATO hadn’t been able to interdict 
LAJ attempts to enter Misurata, this kind of knowledge might have substan-
tially changed the course of the fighting and the outcome of the revolution.
In conflicts without an overwhelming superiority of force on the side of 
the opposition, we must understand the risks associated with opposition 
groups and fighters’ use of mass-audience “civilian” Internet technology. 
This is doubly true when communications remain on networks that remain 
under regime control. More generally, there are inherent dangers associated 
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with using common online tools in high-risk situations, especially given the 
tremendous disparity in security resources and expertise between opposition 
groups and states. Additionally, the emergence of pro-government electronic 
actors, whose behavior and collaboration with governments can be analogized 
to militias in some cases, represents a serious and under documented category 
of online threat. The risk is particularly great for decentralized groups and 
individuals with limited resources and expertise in security, and for whom the 
Internet has become a central tool in their efforts for reform and democracy. 
Failure to understand and prepare for these threats is a substantial risk that 
opposition movements and their international partners and supporters 
cannot afford to take. 
Discussion Questions
1.   After reading this case study, what is your perspective on whether  
commonly used online services are safe enough to provide the  
communications backbone to an opposition movement in a conflict? 
2.   What are the inherent operational security risks to using social network-
ing? How were these risks amplified for the Libyan opposition?
3.   Can you think of two measures that could have been taken by the 
Libyan opposition to increase their operational security, given their 
choice of communications tools? 
4.   Name several ways that an international actor, such as a NATO member 
state, could have assisted the Libyan opposition in increasing their 
operational security and mitigating the threat from PGEAs.
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Libya Country Profile
Libya Before the Uprising: A Brief Note185 
After a military coup in 1969, Libya was ruled by Colonel Muammar Abu 
Minyar al-Gaddafi until 2011. During the first decades of his rule, Gaddafi 
developed unique political philosophy from a combination of socialist theory 
and Islam. He applied this philosophy to the governmental structure of Libya 
while simultaneously using oil revenues to promote this ideology abroad. 
An unsuccessful military attempt to establish control of areas of Northern 
Chad in 1987 led to a retreat, Libya was strongly sanctioned by the United 
Nations over its responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing in 1992. These 
sanctions were suspended and later removed in 2003 after Libya admitted its 
role in the bombing and simultaneously announced it would cease support for 
terrorism and end its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). 
These measures were followed by financial compensation to the victims of 
terrorist acts sponsored by Libya. The U.S. completed its removal of unilateral 
sanctions against Libya in 2006. Libya’s willingness to undertake these measures 
led to a reopening of diplomatic relations, including with Western powers.
This trend of apparent reform continued right up to the uprising, with the 
Libyan government implementing a wide range of measures intended to nor-
malize its diplomatic and economic position. This relatively recent opening 
and the lifting of multilateral and unilateral sanctions explains how a state 
widely perceived as an international pariah could have acquired sophisticated 
export-controlled monitoring and surveillance equipment from Western 
companies like Amesys.
Libya Today
At the time of writing, Libya has passed from the 2011 revolution into 
a challenging period of reconstruction. It is governed under an interim 
constitution by the National Transitional Council, an entity first created 
during the 2011 uprising. After a relatively peaceful election, Libyans have 
elected a General National Congress that will draft Libya’s new, permanent 
constitution, before it is put to a referendum by the Libyan people.
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Timeline of the 2011 Libyan Revolution
The 2011 Libyan revolution lasted just over eight months. The conflict 
began as a series of small protests in the eastern city of Benghazi, the direct 
result of the detention of a well-known lawyer. It ended with the total 
defeat of forces loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and the end of his 
regime. This brief and selective timeline provides an overview of key events 
in the conflict and highlights events relevant to this case study.
The Arab Spring
A series of protests that began in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, have since 
given way to a series of political transformations throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA). After the first protests in Tunisia, which 
forced out its president, leaders in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen have all been 
forced from power. Meanwhile, other countries like Bahrain experienced 
substantial civil unrest, and Syria is undergoing a civil war. Since 2010, 
substantial protests have also taken place in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Morocco, and Sudan, with sporadic protests in Lebanon, Mauritania, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the Western Sahara.186 
In many cases, attempts by MENA governments to control protests seem to 
have had the opposite of the intended effect, fueling protesters’ grievances 
and fulfilling many protestors’ perception that their states are governed by 
regimes incapable of accepting democratic rule or the political preferences 
of large segments of their populations. At the time of writing, not only does 
political unrest continue in several countries, but the political implications 
for the region and beyond continue to unfold. Secondary effects continue 
to unfold as well, such as the ongoing crisis in Mali, which appears to have 
been partially fueled by groups that supported Gaddafi during the Libyan 
revolution, traveling with new weapons and experience to Northern Mali.
The Early Days 
February 4 
  News organizations report that calls for protest in Libya on February 17 
have emerged in social media.
February 13
  Media reports that the Gaddafi regime has arrested some activists using 
social media and warned Libyans not to use Facebook.
February 15
  The first signs that a large popular uprising might be underway. Hundreds 
of protesters take to the streets to protest the arrest of  lawyer Fethi Tarbel, 
who had been campaigning for the release of political prisoners.
February 16
 •  Protests in Tripoli, Benghazi’s central square, Derna, and Zintan result 
in clashes, sometimes violent, with police.
 • “Day of Anger” Facebook page count of followers doubles.
February 17
 •  “Day of Rage”/“Day of Anger”/“Day of Revolt” protests throughout 
Libya. Protests in Benghazi and Tripoli are met with violent, lethal force.
 •  Al Jazeera announces that their programming is being removed from  
state-owned cable networks.
February 18–19
 •  Large protests in Benghazi’s central square. Protests also take place in 
Bayda, Derna, Toubrouk, Misurata, and Tripoli. The protests are met 
with violent, sometimes lethal, force. Some in the international com-
munity express concern over violence against civilians.
 •  The regime undertakes a 6.8- hour Internet blackout in the evening of  
the 18th, and an 8.3-hour Internet blackout on the evening of the 19th. 
 •  Nilesat and Arabsat satellites subjected to jamming from inside Libya.
 •  Mohammed Nabbous establishes Libya Alhurra TV, broadcasting  
from Benghazi.
February 20
 •  Intensity of protests increase in Benghazi, Tripoli, and throughout 
Libya. Reported casualties also increase.
 •  Protesters attempt to seize Green Square in Tripoli.
 •  Reports that elements of the local military have joined in protests.
 •  Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, blames Israel and foreign actors for protests.
 •  International community urges Gaddafi regime to refrain from violence.
 •  News organizations’ attempts to enter Libya are rebuffed.
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February 21–24 
 •    Protests in Benghazi take control of large parts of the city, and  
protesters in Tripoli take control of key buildings as casualty  
numbers continue to grow. 
 •    Later protests in Zawiya and Tripoli are put down with substantial 
lethal force.
 •    Two pilots from Libyan Air Force defect to Malta with their  
Mirage F-1 fighter jets.
 •    Military commander and interior minister Abdul Fatah Younis  
resigns, defects. 
 •    Battle of Misurata begins with attacks on Libyan Air Force planes  
and personnel.
 •    Gaddafi makes appearance on Libyan television to confirm he has not 
fled Tripoli, urges Libyans not to believe television broadcasts from 
“stray dogs.” Within 24 hours makes a second appearance, stating he  
is prepared to die as a “martyr.” Threatens to use even more force. 
 •    Al Jazeera accuses the Libyan government of jamming its signal,  
affecting broadcasting in the region. Pinpoints jamming to Libyan 
government-operated facility south of Tripoli. 
 •    Reporting increasingly highlights the possibility that the regime  
will fall.
February 25
 •    More protests in Tripoli after several days of calm, met with  
intense violence.
 •    Thuraya announces that jamming has been underway for approximately 
a week on their satellites serving Libya, accuses Libyan government, 
says it is working to restore services.
 •    Conflict intensifies, increasingly organized opposition.
February 26–March 2 
 •    UN Security Council votes to impose sanctions, embargo, and asset 
freeze on Gaddafi’s family and regime. Refers Libya’s leaders to the 
International Criminal Court.
 •    Other international sanctions against Gaddafi and his family.
 •    Major battles in Zawiya.
 •    Formation of the National Transitional Council (NTC) on February 26. 
 •    In various interviews and statements, Gaddafi confirms he will not 
step away from power.
 •    Increasingly organized opposition fighting in Benghazi, partly under 
direction of Younis.
March 3
  Total Internet blackout. Phone system disruptions throughout Libya, 
phone services cut to eastern Libya.
March 4 
  The NTC announces that it is the only legitimate representative of Libya 
as Gaddafi loyalists. 
March 5–16
 •    LAJ forces mount sustained attacks against opposition forces in eastern 
Libya, fighting over contested areas of Ras Lanuf, Brega, and Adjdbia.
 •    Countries including France begin to recognize NTC as legitimate  
representative of Libya.
The United Nations Security Council Passes  
Key Resolutions, NATO Begins Air Campaign
March 17
  The UN Security Council votes to impose no-fly zone and other  
military action to protect Libyan civilians.
March 19
 •    UK and French forces launch air attack, halt advance of LAJ forces 
towards Brega. 
 •    Mohammed Nabbous killed hours before the air attack.
March 31 
  NATO Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR officially begins in Libya 
to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, which 
include no-fly zone, civilian protection, and arms embargo.
The Libyan Conflict Extends on Multiple Fronts
April 1– August 19
 •    Libyan opposition forces from Benghazi secure control of Benghazi  
and eastern Libya with the exception of Sirte and neighboring towns.
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 •    After months of siege, fighters from Misurata free the town from LAJ  
forces in mid-May, pushing opposition control south and eastwards. 
 •    Opposition fighters in the Jebel Jafusa (Nafusa Mountains) fight  
town-by-town to assert control over the region.
 •    Southern Libya, Sirte, Sabha, Bani Waleed, Tripoli, and its outskirts  
all remain under LAJ forces’ control.
 •    Hacking of computers first reported in early May. Original locations  
and targets unknown.
August 20–23
 •    Operation ODYSSEY DAWN: Libyan opposition forces enter Tripoli  
from multiple fronts, supported by NATO airstrikes and resistance  
sleeper cells in the capital. They meet only light resistance.
 •    Gaddafi’s compound and broadcasting facilities overrun.
September 8–13 
 •    NTC leader Abdu Jalil arrives in Tripoli, makes first speech from the capital.
 •    Fighting shifts towards goal of overtaking remaining bastions of Gaddafi 
Loyalist control.
Multiple Opposition Fighting Forces Gain Control  
of Remaining Pockets of Gaddafi Loyalists
September 21
  Sabha, bastion of Gaddafi loyalists, falls to NTC control. 
October 17
  Bani Waleed captured, one of the remaining strongholds of  
Gaddafi loyalists.
October 20–22 
 •    NTC fighters establish complete control of Sirte, with support from  
NATO airstrikes, eliminating the last pocket of Gaddafi loyalists.
 •    October 20: Gaddafi is captured and dies in custody.
 •    October 22: End of hostilities announced.
October 31st
 All NATO military operations cease in Libya. 
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The Libyan Electronic Army –  
History and Structure
The self-styled “Electronic Army” tracks its origins, according to a number 
of reports, to a small group of PGEAs who were assembled prior to the 
2011 revolution, although the exact timeline of its creation is uncertain. 
According to an account provided to someone conducting research in 
Libya shortly after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime,187 some of these individuals 
were reportedly active at the encouragement of Gaddafi’s son Mutassim in 
the context of efforts to respond to exile groups’ information operations in 
the late 2000s, although they may have begun working together before this. 
Mutassim had been infuriated by content posted showing him at decadent 
and lavish parties, and the group was reportedly constituted to pull down 
the content and retaliate against the people responsible. Beyond attempting 
to compromise accounts, the group is reported to have systematically 
abused the copyright infringement reporting functionality of sites like 
YouTube to attempt to get users and channels banned. 
While the composition of this early group remains somewhat unclear,  
membership reportedly included requirements of a rudimentary background 
check.188 The term “Electronic Army”189 seems to have been introduced at 
some point during this period. One of the individuals apparently involved 
in this pre-revolution hacking was Ahmed Gwaider, one of the few Libyan 
hackers who was sympathetic to Gaddafi’s regime. Aikins’ reporting has 
Gwaider involved in pro-government hacking prior to 2010, when he was 
provided with a villa and a small team working under him. Gwaider’s skills 
are described as especially keen in tricking or manipulating targets into 
executing malicious software, divulging credentials, or providing access 
to target machines. One dissident described how during the revolution 
Gwaider used social engineering to convince her to open a Microsoft Word 
document containing a malicious file. Gwaider used the software to capture 
photos of the dissident without her headscarf, which he later posted online, 
and to secretly record and exfiltrate a Skype conversation with a foreign 
journalist, which was later broadcast on state television.190 While Gwaider’s 
exact position in the formal LEA structure is unclear, his preference for 
social-engineered malware fits the LEA’s known attack style. 
After the 2011 revolution began, this group of PGEAs evolved into a more 
formalized Libyan Electronic Army (LEA), reportedly at the urging of 
Mohamed Gaddafi. Reports from multiple sources indicate that the LEA 
membership and resources expanded as the conflict began. Equipment was 
purchased, buildings were allocated, and the LEA gained an increasingly for-
malized structure, although the exact organizational hierarchy remains unclear.
Aikins has reported that the group may have had over 600 members in 
Tripoli alone.191 What were the responsibilities of these members? One 
source192 intimately familiar with the LEA described the group as operating 
from at least three locations within Tripoli.193 This individual’s description 
of one location can provide an outline of some of the LEA’s activities. The 
building’s equipment was reportedly purchased as part of a payment of one 
million Libyan dinars (approximately $800,000), allocated by Muammar 
Gaddafi.194 The building, which we will refer to as an organizational unit, 
housed several teams, each with its own leader. There was a Facebook team, 
a YouTube team, a team dedicated to compromising chat accounts (e.g. 
Yahoo! Chat), a team dedicated to producing video and imagery content, 
and so on. The unit included internal network surveillance of the teams’ 
activities. Details are scarce about these internal monitors, but they appear 
to have included a more experienced group in the LEA and were comprised 
of some individuals linked to LTT. LEA volunteers who transgressed while 
on premises were sometimes threatened by their superiors.195 
We can infer from this that the LEA likely had a structure that included 
multiple units, each with a leader, which are likely to have had teams with 
team leaders.196 These units reportedly received direction from Mohammed 
Bayt al-Mal, who held a senior position at LTT, according to Aikins’ report-
ing. However, other names have emerged as working closely with Bayt 
al-Mal from sources familiar with the LEA,197 complicating the idea of a 
unified structure. The same sources also note that the LEA sometimes  
provided information to elements of the LAJ directly involved in propaganda. 
At least one source has named several Libyan television personalities as 
direct recipients of information exfiltrated from compromised opposition 
computers, a narrative that matches the occasional use of clearly hacked 
material (e.g., the audio of Skype calls) on LAJ-controlled channels during 
the conflict. Other parts of the LAJ government may have been recipients 
of this information, but there is limited evidence available at the time of 
writing to confirm a fixed command or reporting relationship.
102  irregular warfare studies 
Appendix D  
Terms and Abbreviations
Common Terms
Amesys – French technology company, creator of the EAGLE intercep-
tion package purchased by Libya
Amesys EAGLE – Massive intercept solution permitting the capture,  
storage, and automated network analysis of a wide range of electronic 
communications
Blackshades NET – A remote-access Trojan be used against the Libyan  
opposition
Domain name server (DNS) – Domain name servers contain databases  
 that link websites’ URLs to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Filtering at 
the DNS entails identifying requests from a user’s computer to connect to a 
restricted or blocked website, then blocking or redirecting these requests to 
alternate websites, and refusing to connect to the correct website’s IP address.
GRAD rocket 122 mm – Unguided multiple rocket artillery launcher   
 that can be truck-mounted. The Grad was a commonly used rocket system 
in Libya, and it figured prominently in LAJ forces’ actions against the 
Libyan opposition.
Huawei – Huawei Technologies Company, a Chinese multinational and  
the world’s largest telecommunications equipment company
Keylogger – Software that records a user’s keystrokes. Commonly in- 
corporated into remote-access Trojans.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (LAJ) – Government of Libya, 1977–2011
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya forces – Term used in this case study to refer to  
all Libyan armed forces (army, air force, navy), pro-Gaddafi tribal units, 
paramilitary forces, and mercenaries
Libyan opposition forces – Term used in this case study to refer to all 
fighting forces loyal to the National Transitional Council, including the 
Free Libyan Air Force, the National Liberation Army, and other anti-
Gaddafi fighting units not under the NTC’s centralized command
Libyan Telecom and Technology – Libya’s Internet provider, chaired by  
Mohamed Gaddafi, son of Muammar Gaddafi
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National Front for the Salvation of Libya – Exiled opposition group,  
active online from the first days of the revolution
Pro-Government Electronic Actor (PGEA) – Author’s term. Hackers and  
other electronic actors whose actions identify them as acting in support of a 
government, but whose direct affiliation with the government are unknown, 
imperfectly understood, informal, not subject to standard government 
hierarchies of command and control, or controversial
Remote-access Trojan – Malicious software that allows a remote attacker  
to execute arbitrary code and exfiltrate information from a target computer
Remote administration tool – See: Remote-access Trojan
Thuraya – A satellite phone and services provider widely used in the   
Middle East and North Africa
Two-way satellite Internet – Equipment for the upload and download  
of data using satellite connectivity, typically including a ground station  
communicating with a satellite network
Very Small Aperture Terminal – Ground station for a two-way satellite  
Internet connection
Voice Over Internet Protocol – Technologies permitting voice communi- 
cation over the Internet
ZTE – Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation, China’s 
second largest telecommunications equipment and services company
ZTE ZXMT – Massive intercept solution by ZTE that permits the capture,  
 storage, and automated network analysis of a wide range of electronic com-
munications
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Common Abbreviations
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service Attack
DNS Domain Name Server
GPTC General Post and Telecommunications Company
IP  Internet Protocol
LAJ  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
LEA  Libyan Electronic Army
LTT  Libyan Telecom and Technology Company
NFSL National Front for the Salvation of Libya 
NTC National Transitional Council
PGEA Pro-Government Electronic Actor
RAT  Remote Administration Tool/Remote-Access Trojan
VOIP Voice Over Internet Protocol 
VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal
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Notes
185. Paraphrased from “Libya,” CIA World Factbook, 
2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html
186. For an in-depth review of the events of the 
Arab Spring up to the end of 2011, see “Arabian 
Spring 2010-2011,” Uppsala University, Depart-
ment of Peace and Conflict Research, http://www. 
pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/87/87711_chronologic_
timeline_arabian_spring.pdf 
187. The individual conducting research requested to 
remain anonymous, citing security concerns, and 
is referred to here as L5. Personal communication 
with the author, Winter 2012-2013. 
188. Ibid.
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190. “M. Aikins, “Jamming Tripoli: Inside Moammar 
Gadhafi’s Secret Surveillance Network,” Wired, 
May 18, 2012, http://www.wired.com/threat 
level/2012/05/ff_libya/ 
191. Aikins, “Jamming Tripoli.”
192. Personal communication with L5.
193. Locations: One in the Dahra neighborhood of 
Tripoli, another in the vicinity of Abu Slim, and the 
third near the Tareeg al Shat (the Coastal Road). 
Other locations have been suggested by other 
sources but remain unclear at time of writing.
194. Ibid. Reportedly intended to be followed by a 
second payment. It is unclear whether this  
payment was ever made.
195. Ibid.
196. It is unclear whether any of these teams operated 
across LEA locations or whether each team 
operated only under the authority of the unit 
they were located in; however, those that the 
source was familiar with appear to have operated 
somewhat independently of each other.
197. Ibid. 
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Discussion Questions — from the text
CHAPTER ONE 
  1.  How did Libya’s level of Internet penetration compare to its neighbors? 
Does this challenge the idea that the Internet could have facilitated an 
Internet shutdown?
  2.   How might Libya’s centralized Internet infrastructure and governance 
have facilitated an Internet shutdown?
CHAPTER TWO 
  1.   What kind of signal did Libya send the world when it shut down the 
Internet? 
  2.   What kind of considerations are likely to have influenced the LAJ’s 
decision to shut down the Internet?
  3.   How did blocking the Internet affect the credibility of news reports 
from the ground?
CHAPTER THREE 
  1.   What immediate effects did the Internet shutdown have on the Libyan 
opposition’s communications ability?
  2.   What kind of trust was required to maintain satellite phone and VSAT 
connectivity? 
  3.   In what ways did access to two-way satellite Internet (VSATs) transform 
Misurata’s strategic position? How might their situation have been differ-
ent without access to the Internet?
  4.   In what ways was the Libyan opposition able to create a communications 
structure that could serve both military and civilian needs? Can you 
think of key areas that the opposition did not address?
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CHAPTER FOUR
  1.   How did media coverage of social media expand and amplify the reach 
of actions in that realm?
  2 .  In what ways does Mohammed Nabbous exemplify the ways in which 
individual Libyans were able to use the Internet to influence the interna-
tional perception of the Uprising?
  3.   How did the Libyan opposition’s use of YouTube evolve over the course 
of the conflict? What effect is this likely to have had on their credibility?
  4.   What does Ms. Clinch’s story indicate about how the Internet can make 
global networks of support possible?
  5.   How did the pro-regime online activities and messaging on social media 
contrast with that of pro-opposition online activity?
CHAPTER FIVE 
  1.   How did networks of support and trust expand the Libyan opposition’s 
access to resources? Were these networks complemented by social media?
  2.   How did NATO publicly explain how it was using social media? What 
are some of the ways that this might have shaped how the Libyan opposi-
tion used social media? What were some of the risks to this kind of 
disclosure?
  3.   What are two ways that particularly struck or surprised you about how 
the opposition used common tools to communicate? What kinds of 
functionality do these tools have that might not be found in their  
military equivalents? What do they lack?
CHAPTER SIX 
  1.   How did the Libyan opposition’s forced switch to two-way satellite 
Internet and other connectivity impact the level of visibility that the 
LAJ had on Libyan network communications? 
  2.   What strategies did the LAJ undertake to regain access to Libyan  
opposition communications?
  3.   The LAJ deployed PGEAs to hack the opposition’s communications. 
What factors do you suspect contributed to their success in penetrating  
in some cases? What factors might have protected other opposition 
members?
  4.   PGEAs used inexpensive commercial malware designed for cybercrime 
and simple hacking techniques. Should these be considered “poor man’s 
cyber weapons”? Why or why not?
CHAPTER SEVEN 
  1.   After reading this case study, what is your perspective on whether  
commonly used online services are safe enough to provide the  
communications backbone to an opposition movement in a conflict? 
  2.   What are the inherent operational security risks to using social net-
working? How were these risks amplified for the Libyan opposition?
  3.   Can you think of two measures that could have been taken by the 
Libyan opposition to increase their operational security, given their 
choice of communications tools? 
  4.   Name several ways that an international actor, such as a NATO member 
state, could have assisted the Libyan opposition in increasing their 
operational security and mitigating the threat from PGEAs.
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